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ABSTRACT 
 
During the past decade, foreign exchange reserves of China and Japan have increased 
dramatically. For instance, China’s foreign exchange reserve rose from $954.6 billion in 
January 2007 to $3.5 trillion in April 2016. China and Japan seem to hold large foreign 
reserves, much more than are necessary to facilitate their imports. The WTO regulates only 
tariff and various non-tariff barriers but has made little effort to regulate the bilateral 
exchange rates because exchange rate practices are within the purview of the IMF. At 
present, the World Trade Organization (WTO) does not treat currency devaluation as a 
protective trade policy. In my dissertation, I have chosen three topics in the area of 
international economics. The first chapter argues that currency devaluation is equivalent to 
an import tariff, and hence currency devaluation should be treated as a trade policy 
instrument. The second chapter considers the employment effects of currency devaluations in 
a Keynesian open economy. Currency devaluation may decrease domestic employment and 
increase the social welfare. Under plausible conditions, the optimal policy is to get rid of 
domestic unemployment in input sectors. The third chapter investigates the effects of public 
capital investment in the export sector for the labor movement and capital formation and 
identifies the contribution of public capital and other economic factors to the productivity 
growth rate in the firm sector. We show that the optimal tariffs are positive but decrease to 
the steady state level. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 This dissertation addresses two main issues in international economics, currency 
devaluation and import tariffs. John Maynard Keynes (1931, p.199) partly recognized the effect 
of devaluation, when he argued that “Precisely the same effects as those produced by a 
devaluation of sterling by a given percentage could be brought about by a tariff of the same 
percentage on all imports together [italics added] with an equal subsidy on all exports…” The 
second chapter shows whether yuan devaluations are equivalent to import tariffs in a two-good, 
two-currency model. Even if no tariffs or quotas are employed, our analysis shows that a country 
can restrict imports by undervaluing its currency. Contrary to Keynes’s statement, a 50 percent 
devaluation from the benchmark exchange rate is shown to yield the same import price and 
volume as a 100 percent tariff on imports without an export subsidy. Using the available yuan-
dollar exchange rates and bilateral U.S.-China trade data, it is shown that during the period 1994 
- 2015, China’s yuan has been grossly undervalued.  On average, the yuan was devalued by 45 
percent, and the average of tariff equivalents of the undervalued yuan was 87.5 percent for the 
period 1994-2015.  The finding that tariffs and the undervalued yuan have the same effects on 
domestic prices and import volumes.  
 During the past two decades, many Asian Counties have accumulated foreign exchange 
reserves. For instance, China, Japan, and South Korea have accumulated $3.5 trillion, $1.32 
trillion and $0.37 trillion as of April 2016, respectively. In developing countries, maintaining low 
unemployment rate is far more important than other economic problems. Thus, the Chinese 
government may adopt low yuan policy and accumulate foreign exchange reserves, not to take 
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advantage of its trading partners, but to reduce unemployment. Since the exchange rate pass-
through on the relative price of import good in the U.S. is not complete, The third chapter 
investigates optimal exchange rate for a Keynesian open economy. We consider an open 
economy that produces two tradable goods. In the benchmark equilibrium, all firms are price 
takers and the yuan price of the dollar is determined by the demand and supply of traded goods. 
Under a plausible scenario, the optimal yuan value of the dollar is less than that which ensures 
full employment. China may pursue the low yuan policy to reduce domestic unemployment and 
to maximize gross domestic product. 
In many developing counties, lack of public infrastructures such as highways, 
transportation, power and water system is slowing economic growth because the infrastructure 
systems are crucial input factors for domestic production. Public investment plays an important 
role and a major policy issue in developing countries. A number of studies support that public 
capital has a powerful impact on the productivity of private capital. The fourth chapter addresses 
the relationship between the government expenditure in public capital stock and economic 
growth and examine an optimal import tariff for increase in public capital stock in a small open 
economy. This practice explains rationale for government provision of public goods based on the 
market failure, internalizes externalities in the private production function. Moreover, the paper 
is alternatively answering "Why does the government devalue its own currency and change the 
terms of trade in the short run? " The effect of change in exchange rate is the similar to that of 
import tariffs which changes the relative price in domestic economy. This distortion of 
government policy discourages current consumptions for import goods and encourage 
consumptions of home goods and capital investments. 
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CHAPTER 2.  TARIFF EQUIVALENTS OF CHINA’S UNERVALUED YUAN 
 
2.1  Abstract 
This paper considers a two-good, two-currency model to demonstrate that undervalued currency 
is equivalent to an import tariff. Contrary to Keynes’s statement, a 50 percent devaluation from 
the benchmark exchange rate is shown to yield the same import price and volume as a 100 
percent tariff on imports without an export subsidy. A numerical example based on a Cobb-
Douglas utility function illustrates the main proposition. Using the Chinese trade data and U.S. 
consumer price index, we show that China’s yuan was undervalued by 45 percent on average for 
the period 1994-2015, and the average of equivalent tariffs was 87.5 percent on China’s imports. 
 
2.2  Introduction 
 
 The People’s Bank of China (PBC), the central bank of China, began to regulate renminbi 
on January 1, 1994 by moving the official rate to the then-prevailing swap market rates, which 
contributed to the steady increase in China’s foreign exchange reserve (Goldstein and Lardy 
2009). During the past two decades, China’s foreign exchange reserve rose significantly, 
surpassing $3.3 trillion as of December 2015.  
Those who investigated China’s yuan policy during the past ten years generally agreed 
that the Chinese yuan has been undervalued, but their estimates of yuan undervaluation vary 
widely. Funke and Rahn (2005) noted that in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the yuan 
was stabilized but undervalued by 15 percent in 1999.  Gan et al. (2013) estimates he RMB 
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was undervalued by an average of 6.7 percent. In a multinational comparison of currency 
undervaluation, Chang (2007) noted that the yuan was undervalued by 22 percent in 2001. Wren-
Lewis (2004) suggested a 20 percent devaluation of the yuan against the dollar in 2002, whereas 
Coudert and Couharde (2007) reported that the bilateral renminbi-dollar exchange rate was 
undervalued by 60 percent during the same year. Chang and Shao (2004) noted that RMB was 
undervalued 22.5 percent in 2003. Claud Meyer (2008, p. 7) stated that “over the period 2002-
2007, the undervaluation of the RMB would be on this basis in the range of 10-15 percent 
against the US$.” Garroway et al’s (2012) estimate of undervaluation in 2007 for renminbi was 
15 percent. Referring to the current value of the yuan, Bergsten (2010) observed that “The 
Chinese renminbi is undervalued by about 25 percent on a trade-weighted average basis and by 
about 40 percent against the dollar.”  
The dramatic rise in China’s cumulative trade surplus has spurred a debate concerning 
China’s currency valuation and misalignment. The common view is that China has intentionally 
depressed the value of its currency, the renminbi (RMB), to gain unfair advantages in the global 
market.i (Cheung et al., 2009, Cheung, 2012).  
 These estimates of yuan undervaluation often are used to justify policy recommendations 
to exert pressure on China to modify its currency policy. For example, Bergsten (2010) of the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics recently suggested that the RMB must appreciate 
by approximately 40 percent against the dollar to correct current “global imbalances” and urged 
the United States to take multilateral, and if necessary unilateral action, to pressure China to 
change its ways. 
John Maynard Keynes (1931, p.199) partly recognized the effect of devaluation, when he 
argued that “Precisely the same effects as those produced by a devaluation of sterling by a given 
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percentage could be brought about by a tariff of the same percentage on all imports together 
[italics added] with an equal subsidy on all exports…”  Also, Kong (2012) recognized that long-
term devaluation of a major currency such as the Chinese yuan may endanger the entire world 
trading system. 
By design the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is concerned with exchange rate 
practices, while GATT /WTO is interested in regulating trade practices. Currency practices fall 
within the purview of the IMF, and are generally considered to be outside the jurisdiction of the 
WTO. Although currency devaluation affects international trade, the WTO has made little effort 
to regulate the exchange rate practices of member countries because any such attempt may be 
viewed as “intruding into the domain of the IMF.” (Kong, 2012, p. 112) While the two 
institutions complement each other, neither institution has been willing to take actions on 
currency practices that have spillover effects on world trade. Hence, the hesitation of the IMF to 
take action against countries that manipulate exchange rates to gain “unfair advantage” over their 
trading partners. 
Section 2.3 presents the basic model of two goods and two currencies, and Section 2.4 
investigates the equivalence of devaluations and tariffs. Section 2.5 provides graphical 
illustrations of the effects of devaluation, while Section 2.6 uses a numerical example with a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function. Section 2.7 provides empirical estimates of China’s import 
demand and export supply function, which yield estimates of yuan devaluations for the period 
1994-2015, and Section 2.8 offers concluding remarks. 
 
 
6 
2.3  The Basic Model 
In order to compare the effects China’s tariffs and currency devaluation on trade, we first 
construct a basic model with two goods and two currencies. There are two countries, the home 
country, China, and the foreign country, the United States. We employ the following 
assumptions to describe the production side of China’s economy: 
(i) Supplies of the two tradable goods are subject to the production possibility function (PPF), 
( )C F Z= , where C and Z are the outputs of the exportable and the importable. 
(ii) Each country fixes the price of its exportable good, i.e., the yuan price b of good C is fixed in 
China, and the dollar price P* of good Z is fixed in the United States.  
(iii) Perfect competition prevails in the domestic product and resources are fully employed. 
Let ε denote the dollar price of Chinese yuan, and P be the yuan price of the importable 
good Z. China fixes the yuan price of its exportable good C, and the United States also fixes the 
dollar price of its exportable (good Z).  That is, the yuan price b of good C and the dollar price 
*P Pε=  of good Z are fixed and remain unaltered whether a tariff is imposed or the yuan is 
devalued. If no tariff is imposed, the relative price of the importable in China is / * / .P b P bε=  
Let c and z denote the domestic consumption of the exportable and importable, and let x and q 
denote the physical volumes of exports and imports. Then x C c= −  and .q z Z= −  The dollar 
value of imports is *qP .  
Domestic producers are assumed to maximize yuan revenue ( ) ,R bF Z PZ= +  where 
1,b =  since the exportable is the numéraire.  The first order condition for revenue maximization 
requires  
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 ' 0,bF P+ =   (1) 
 
i.e., domestic price of the importable is equal to its marginal cost. The second order condition is 
" 0,F <  which is satisfied if the PPF is concave to the origin.  
 Domestic supplies of the tradable goods depend on the domestic prices of the tradable 
goods, i.e., ( , )C b P  and ( , )Z b P . Supplies of the tradable goods are homogenous of degree zero 
in all prices, i.e., doubling all prices has no effect on the supplies. Differentiating (1) with respect 
to P yields "( / ) 1 0,bF Z P∂ ∂ + =  / 1/ " 0Z P bF∂ ∂ = − > . That is, the domestic supply of the 
importable good is positively sloped. Accordingly, / 0,C P∂ ∂ <  i.e., an increase in the price of 
the importable good shifts the supply of the exportable good to the left. 
 Let oε  denote the equilibrium exchange rate under free trade,ii i.e., when 0t =  and 
* *.o
PP P
ε
= =  China’s supply functions are written as ( , )C b P  and ( , ).Z b P  Assume that the 
government imposes a tariff on its imports and devalues the yuan below the equilibrium level, 
oε . Then the domestic price of the importable is 
 1* .tP P
ε
+
=   (2) 
 
 The supply functions are written as: *(1 )( , ) , ,P tC C b P C b
ε
+ = =  
 
 ( , ) 0,PC b P <  and 
*(1 )( , ) , ,P tZ Z b P Z b
ε
+ = =  
 
( , ) 0.PZ b P >  Producer revenue in yuan is 
 ( ) ( ), *(1 ) / , *(1 ) / .R bC b P t PZ b P tε ε= + + +   
8 
 
 
 
In order to compare tariffs and devaluation on an equal footing, we assume that consumers 
receive income only from production. Any tariff revenue is retained by the government as a 
budget surplus, and not rebated to consumers. Thus, consumer expenditure, I is the same, 
whether a tariff is used or the yuan is devalued from the benchmark equilibrium. 
 Consumer demands for the tradable goods can be rewritten as 
 ( ) ( )( , , ) , *(1 ) / , ,   ( , , ) , *(1 ) / , .c b P I c b P t I z b P I z b P t Iε ε= + = +   (3) 
where consumer expenditure .I R=   Recall that oε  is the equilibrium exchange rate under free 
trade, i.e. 1oε = , when 0t =  and * *.o
PP P
ε
= =    
 Let the dollar price of the exportable be denoted by *b bε= . Since the dollar price of the 
importable P* is fixed in the United States, a yuan appreciation raises the domestic price of the 
importable, * / .P P ε=  The first order conditions are  
 .c
z
u b
u P
=   (4) 
Demand functions for the tradables can be written as: ( , , )c c b P I=   and ( , , )z z b P I= . Indirect 
utility is given by ( )( , , ) ( , , ), ( , , ) .V b P I u c b P I z b P I=   
 For given consumer expenditure I , domestic price P also completely determines the import 
demand function and the export supply function,  
 ( , , ) ( , ),   ( , ) ( , , ).q z b P I Z b P x C b P c b P I= − = −  (5) 
9 
The yuan amount China’s consumers pay for foreign imports is ,qP  and the amount of money 
China receives in dollars for its exports is ( ).x C cε ε= −  
2.4  Equivalence of Devaluations and Tariffs 
In his Committee on Finance & Industry Report (1931, p. 199), apparently Keynes had 
thought that a sterling devaluation does not affect the relative prices of traded goods, because he 
said the same effect could be achieved by a tariff of the same percentage on all imports together 
with an equal subsidy on all exports, which does not affect the relative prices of importable or 
the exportable.  It is apparent that despite the change in the price of gold, Kenyes thought that a 
sterling devaluation can keep the ratio of the price of the importable to that of the exportable 
unchanged.  However, “by diminishing by 10 per cent. the gold parity of sterling” Keynes was 
necessarily changing the relative price of gold, whether gold is an importable, an exportable or a 
nontradable good. 
 We first consider the benchmark case where the tariff rate is zero and the exchange rate is at 
equilibrium, i.e., 1oε = , so that trade surplus in dollars is zero, * 0.os x P qε= − =   Assume now 
that the yuan is devalued below the equilibrium exchange rate,  1 1,ε δ= − <  where δ is the 
devaluation rate from the benchmark equilibrium. For example, .1δ =  represents a 10 percent 
devaluation from the equilibrium rate. The associated yuan price of the importable is 
* * ,
1
P PPδ
ε δ
= =
−
(6) 
10 
which implies a yuan devaluation (a decrease in ε) raises the domestic price Pδ  of the 
importable. Moreover, the relative price of good C in the United States is: 
*( ) / .
* ( ) / ( )
b b b
P P P
ε ε
ε ε ε
= =  
That is, the relative price of good C is the same in both countries, but it can be manipulated by a 
currency devaluation. 
Tariff Equivalent of a Yuan Devaluation 
In a seminal paper Bhagwati (1965, p. 53) defined the tariff equivalent of an import quota 
"in the sense that a tariff rate will produce an import level which, if alternatively set as a quota, 
will produce an identical discrepancy between foreign and domestic prices." Thus, the tariff 
equivalent of an import quota yields the same domestic price and import volume. Likewise, the 
tariff equivalent of a devaluation is defined as the tariff which yields the same domestic price and 
import volume. 
We now show that tariffs and devaluations are equivalent in the sense of Bhagwati. Let 
tP  denote the yuan price of the importable associated with a tariff. Given the benchmark 
exchange rate ( 1oε = ), domestic price of the importable is  
*(1 ).tP P t= +  (7) 
11 
The yuan-dollar exchange rate when the yuan is devalued from the benchmark rate 1oε =  is 
1 .ε δ= −   A tariff rate t is equivalent to a 100 δ×  percent devaluation, if the same domestic price 
is achieved through the tariff, i.e., 
*.t PP Pδ
ε
= = (8) 
Thus, the tariff equivalent of a given exchange rate ε is: 
1 .t ε
ε
−
= (9) 
For instance, a 10 percent devaluation is equivalent to an 11 percent tariff, i.e.,  
.1/ .9 11.11%t = = . 
Effects on Production and Consumer Income 
When a tariff is imposed and 1ε = , the supply of the importable is: 
( )( , ) , *(1 ) ,tZ b P Z b P t= +  where tP  is the yuan price of good Z when an import tariff t is 
imposed. When a devaluation occurs, ( , ) ( , * / ),Z b P Z b Pδ ε=  where Pδ  is the yuan price of Z 
when the rate of yuan devaluation is δ. Recall that the supply of the importable, ( , )Z b P  , is 
monotone increasing in P. Thus, ( ) ( ), *(1 ) , * /Z b P t Z b P ε+ =  if, and only if *(1 ) * / ,P t P ε+ =
or 1 .
1 t
ε =
+
 That is, the import volume of Z remains the same, whether a devaluation, 
1
1
t
t
δ ε= − =
+
, occurs, or its equivalent tariff is imposed. Likewise, under both regimes 
12 
domestic production of the exportable is the same,  ( , ) ( , )tC b P C b Pδ= , as is the yuan value of 
China’s income,  
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) .t t t tR bC b P P Z b P bC b P P Z b P Rδ δ δ δ≡ + = + ≡   
Thus, when ,
1
t
t
δ =
+
 consumers have the same income, ,tI I δ= equal to producer revenue, 
tR Rδ=  under both regimes. 
Effects on Import Volume 
 Recall from (5), the import demand function is ( , , ) ( , , ) ( , )q b P I z b P I Z b P= − . Since all 
prices and income are the same under both regimes, consumer demands for the exportable and 
the importable are the same, ( , , ) ( , , )t tc b P I c b P Iδ δ=  and z( , ) ( , ).t tP I z P Iδ δ=  The import 
demand function with a tariff is given by ( , , ) ( , ).t t t tq z b P I Z b P= −  Likewise, the import 
demand function with the devalued yuan is ( , , ) ( , ).q z b P I Z b Pδ δ δ δ= −  Thus, the import 
volumes are the same under both regimes, i.e., ( , , ) ( , , )t tq b P I q b P Iδ δ= . Since both t and δ yield 
the same domestic prices and the same volume of imports, there exists a tariff that is equivalent 
to any yuan devaluation, and vice versa. 
Proposition 1: Suppose the government devalues the yuan below the benchmark equilibrium 
exchange rate, 1oε = . Then the domestic price rises above the import price to *PPδ
ε
= , and
13 
import volume falls to .qδ  The tariff equivalent, 1t ε
ε
−
= , yields the same domestic price, 
tP Pδ=  and the same import volume, .tq qδ=  
The relationship between an exchange rate and its equivalent tariff in (9) can be written as: 
.
1
t δ
δ
=
−
 (10) 
This shows that a yuan devaluation is more potent than an equal tariff. That is, a 10 percent yuan 
devaluation from the benchmark rate is more restrictive than an equal tariff rate in reducing the 
import volume. Alternatively, if an import tariff of 10 percent is used to restrict imports, the 
same volume of import can be achieved by less than a 10 percent devaluation of the yuan, since 
from (10), we have 
.
1
t t
t
δ = <
+
 (11) 
For instance, a 50 percent devaluation ( 1 0.5δ ε= − = ) from the equilibrium exchange rate 
1oε =  is equivalent to a 100 percent tariff, and domestic price rises 100 percent with the same 
volume of import in both regimes. Likewise, a 20 percent yuan devaluation is equivalent to a 25 
percent tariff.  
Tariff cum Devaluation 
 Next, consider the case where the yuan is devalued and a tariff is imposed simultaneously. 
In this case, domestic price rises to: 1* .tP P
ε
+
=  We now show that a pairing ( , )t ε  of a tariff
14 
and an exchange rate is equivalent to a single tariff τ. Since both instruments yield the same 
domestic prices, the tariff equivalent of a joint tariff cum devaluation is defined by 
1*(1 ) * ,tP Pτ
ε
+
+ =  or 11 .tτ
ε
+
+ =   That is, an import tariff cum devaluation is equivalent to a 
single tariff τ. Notice that the single tariff exceeds the sum of the tariff rate and the rate of yuan 
devaluation, 
.
1
t tδτ δ
δ
+
= > +
−
  (12) 
Moreover, when both are used, the total effect on the import price is superadditive, i.e., a 10 
percent devaluation plus a 10 percent tariff is equivalent to a single tariff of 22.22 percent. 
2.5  Graphical Illustration 
The effect of currency devaluation on imports is shown in Figure 2.1. Note that demand 
for the importable z depends on P and revenue R, which in turn depends on the domestic price P. 
Assume both the exportable and importable are normal goods. For the purpose of graphical 
illustration, we employ reduced form demand functions which incorporate the income effects. 
The reduced form demand functions for the importable and the exportable 
are: ( )( , ) , , ( , )z b P z b P R b P≡  and ( )( , ) , , ( , ) .c b P c b P R b P≡  An increase in P not only decreases 
the quantity of the importable demanded, but also raises producer revenue or income R, which 
partially offsets the direct effect. We assume that the direct effect is dominant, i.e., 
( , ) / 0.z b P P∂ ∂ <   
15 
 
 
 The demand curve ( , )z b P  and the supply curve ( , )Z b P  are shown in Figure 2.1. Recall 
that the reduced form import demand ( , )z b P  already includes the income effect of a rise in the 
domestic price on producer revenue. In the benchmark equilibrium, there is no tariff and the 
exchange rate is 1oε =  and the domestic price is *.P P=  Import volume is the gap gd. When 
the yuan is devalued, domestic price rises to * /P ε  and the import volume shrinks to the gap 
' '.a h    
Figure 2.2 shows the demand and supply of the exportable. Recall that / 0C P∂ ∂ <  and 
/ 0.c P∂ ∂ >  An increase in P raises the quantity of the exportable demanded, and the consequent 
rise in consumer income further reinforces the direct effect. Thus, ( ) / 0,c P P∂ ∂ >  and ( )c P  is 
positively sloped when plotting against the price of the importable. Also, / 0C P∂ ∂ <  implies 
that the supply of the exportable falls with P. 
 In the benchmark equilibrium, there is no tariff, and the exchange rate is 1oε = , and the 
domestic price is *.P P=  Export volume is the gap between ( )C P  and ( )c P at P*, equal to gd. 
When the yuan is devalued, domestic price rises to * /P ε , and the export volume shrinks to the 
gap ' '.a h    
 
2.6  A Numerical Example: The Case of a Cobb-Douglas Utility Function 
 
 Consumer preferences are represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function  
 .25 .25( , ) ,U c z c z=  (13) 
and the production possibility frontier (PPF) is given by 
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 2 2 2 2 2 ,a C Z Kθ+ =  (14) 
where a, θ and K are parameters. Producers are assumed to maximize revenue ,R bC PZ= +  
subject to the PPF. The Lagrangian function is: 2 2 2 2 2[ ].bC PZ K a C Zφ λ θ= + + − −  The first 
order conditions yield the equilibrium condition,
2
2 ,
b a C
P Zθ
=  or 
 
2
2 .
a PZ C
bθ
=   (15) 
   
From equations (14) and (15),  supplies of the exportable and importable are 
2 2 2 2
K bC
a b a P
θ
θ
=
+
 and 
2 2 2 2
.K aPZ
b a Pθ θ
=
+
 Since the PPF is concave, the supply of the 
importable good is positively sloped, '( ) 0Z P > , and hence '( ) 0C P < . Maximized producer 
revenue is:  
 
2 2 2 2
.K b a PR
a
θ
θ
+
=  (16) 
 
The Case of Devaluation 
When the yuan is devalued, the supplies of the tradables are 
2 2 2 2( )
K bC
a b a P
δ
δ
θ
θ
=
+
 
and 
2 2 2 2
.
( )
K aPZ
b a P
δ
δ
δθ θ
=
+
 Producer revenue is  
 
2 2 2 2( ) .K b a PI R
a
δ
δ δ θ
θ
+
= =   (17) 
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Consumer demands are: 
2 2 2 2( ) ,
2 2
K b a PIc
a
δδ
δ θ
θ
+
= =  and 
2 2 2 2( ) .
2 2
K b a PIz
P P a
δδ
δ
δ δ
θ
θ
+
= =  
The Case of Tariff 
For any given tariff t, the supplies of the exportable and the importable are: 
2 2 2 2( )
t
t
K bC
a b a P
θ
θ
=
+
, and 
2 2 2 2
.
( )
t
t
t
K aPZ
b a Pθ θ
=
+
 Producer revenue under a tariff is 
 
2 2 2 2( ) .
t
t t K b a PI R
a
θ
θ
+
= =   (18) 
 
Domestic demands for the tradables are: 
 
2 2 2 2( )
2 2
tt
t K b a PIc
a
θ
θ
+
= =  and 
2 2 2 2( ) .
2 2
tt
t
t t
K b a PIz
P P a
θ
θ
+
= =   
 
Equivalence of Yuan Devaluation and a Tariff 
When an equivalent tariff is imposed, ( )1 * ,tP t P Pδ+ ==  and hence tC Cδ= , tZ Z δ=  
and consumer income is the same under both regimes, i.e., .tI I δ=  Clearly, if tP Pδ=  and 
,tI I δ=  then tc cδ= , and .tz zδ=  Thus, the trade volumes are the same under both regimes, i.e., 
tq qδ=  and ,tx xδ=  as shown in Table 1. 
2.7  Tariff Equivalents of China’s Undervalued Yuan 
 In this section, we estimate the extent of undervaluation of China’s yuan, using the trade 
and exchange rate data for the period 1994 -2015. While the yuan-dollar exchange rates are 
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available in monthly data, the import and export statistics are quarterly data. Thus, the exchange 
rate of the last month of each quarter is used as the exchange rate of each quarter. China GDP 
data is obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, while U.S. GDP data is from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. We also utilized the monthly data for Sino-US bilateral trade in goods 
from the US census (https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html). China’s 
monthly nominal exchange rates are obtained from the State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange (SAFE) of the People's Republic of China, while Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the 
United States and China are from the OECD (https://data.oecd.org/price/inflation-cpi.htm). 
VAR (Vector Autoregressive) and VECM (Vector Error Correction Model) are most 
often used to find relationships with two or more endogenous variables. Even though variables 
are individually non-stationary, they may be cointegrated. For instance, export, income and 
exchange rate may have one cointegrating relationship. We employ Johansen’s (1998) Vector 
Error Correction Model (VECM) to explore the long-term relationships and short-term dynamics 
among endogenous variables. The model shows that in the long run, endogenous variables 
converge to their cointegrated relations. The long run relationships are investigated in three steps. 
First, the order of integration of variables is determined by Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF). 
Second, if each variable is integrated in the same order, i.e., I(1), a sequence test (Johansen 1995) 
is performed to determine the cointegrating rank r which indicates the maximum possible 
number of cointegrated equations. We test the null hypothesis of 0r =  against 1r ≥  to 
determine whether there is one cointegrating relationship. If the hypothesis of 0r =  is rejected, 
there is no relationship among the variables and there is no need for VECM, in which case, a 
VAR model can be employed. Finally, if there exist cointegrated relationships, then Johansen’s 
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cointegration test is used to detect long term relationships between exports (imports) and 
exchange rate. 
Consider China’s import expenditure and export revenue functions, 
* *( , , )t t t tX g GDP P ε= and ( , , )t t t tQ f GDP P ε= , where tGDP  is China’s gross domestic income 
(GDP), *tGDP  is the United States’ GDP, P* is the US CPI, P is Chinese CPI and tε  is the dollar 
price of the yuan. This model is similar to Bahmani-Oskooee and Ardalani (2006) model which 
employed real effective exchange rate rather than CPI and nominal exchange rate.  
The dollar values of exports (X) and imports (Q) are written as: 
 * *1 2 3ln ln ln ,t o t t t XtX GDP Pα α α α ε ω= + + + +   (19) 
 1 2 3ln ln ln ,t o t t t QtQ GDP Pβ β β β ε ω= + + + +   (20) 
where α’s and β’s are unknown parameters and Xtω  and Qtω  are error terms with zero mean and 
variances 2Xσ  and 
2
Qσ  , respectively. Our analysis suggests that 2 ,α  and 1β  are positive while 
2β  and 3β  are negative. However, 1α  may be negative or positive, depending on the 
characteristics of the exportable goods of China. If China’s export is a normal (inferior) good, 
then 1α  is positive (negative). 
We estimate the long-run relations between US-China bilateral trade and the exchange 
rate, using cointegration and error-correction modeling.   
Unit Root Test 
 We examine the stochastic properties of the variables using Dickey and Fuller (1981) 
tests of unit roots. Unit root tests are based on estimating the following univariate models:  
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 0 1 ( 1) 1
2
p
t t i t i t
i
y y yα α β ε− − +
=
∆ = + + +∑   (21) 
 0 1 ( 1) 12
2
p
t t i t i t
i
ty y yα α α β ε− − +
=
∆ = + + + +∑   (22) 
where y is the variable to be tested for unit roots and t is the time trend.  Equation (21) tests for 
unit roots around a constant, while equation (22) tests for unit roots around a constant and 
deterministic trend. The lag lengths, p, are chosen using Schwarz’s information criterion. Under 
the null hypothesis, 1: 0oH α =  implies that the variable has a unit root.  
Cointegration Tests 
 Tests of cointegration under symmetric adjustment are based on the methodology 
developed by Johansen (1991), and Johansen and Juselius (1993). Johansen's method is to test 
the restrictions imposed by cointegration on the unrestricted VAR, involving the series.  The 
mathematical form of a VAR is 
 1 1t o t p t p t ty A A y A y Bx ω− −= + + + + +   (23) 
where ty  is an n-vector of non-stationary I(1) variables, tx  is a d-vector of deterministic 
variables, 1,A  …, pA  and B are matrices of coefficients to be estimated, and tε  is a vector of 
innovations that may be contemporaneously correlated with each other. However, they are 
uncorrelated with their own lagged values and other right-hand side variables.  
The corresponding vector error correction model can be written as, 
 1 1 1 .t o t p t p t t ty B B y B y B x y vπ− − −∆ = + ∆ + + ∆ + ∆ + +   (24) 
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Granger’s representation theorem asserts that if the coefficient matrix π has a reduced rank 
r n<  , then there exist n r×  matrices, α , and β , each with rank r such that 'π αβ=  and ' tyβ  
are stationary. Here, r is the number of cointegrating relations, and each column of β  is a 
cointegrating vector. For n endogenous non-stationary variables, there can be from (0) to (n-1) 
linearly independent, cointegrating relations. Cointegration implies the existence of stable 
relations among the variables in the model, and causality in at least one direction.  The Error 
Correction Model (ECM) is used to test for the direction of causality in both short- and long-run 
(Engle and Granger, 1987). Thus, we examine causality between exports (or imports) and the 
nominal exchange rate using their corresponding ECM models.  In particular, we are interested 
in the following two error-correction models associated with import demand and export supply 
function: 
The export supply is given by: 
1 1 *
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 * 1
2 3
1 1
ln ln ln
ln ln ,
n n
t Xt i t i i t i
i i
n n
i t i i t i
i i
X ECT X GDP
P
α λ θ θ
θ θ ε
− −
= =
− −
= =
∆ = + + ∆ + ∆
+ ∆ + ∆
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
(25) 
and the import demand is written as: 
2 2
1 2 1 1 1
1 1
2 2
2 1 3
1 1
ln ln ln
ln ln ,
n n
t Xt i t i i t
i i
n n
i t i t i
i i
Q ECT Q GDP
P
β λ θ θ
θ θ ε
− −
= =
− −
= =
∆ = + + ∆ + ∆
+ ∆ + ∆
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
(26) 
where ECT is the error correction term, derived from the long-run cointegration relationship and 
measures the magnitude of the past disequilibrium. In each equation, the change in the left-hand side 
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(LHS) variable is caused by past changes in the variable itself, past changes in other variables, as well as a 
fraction 2λ of the previous equilibrium error.  Given these specifications, the presence of short-run and 
long-run causality could be tested.  
Empirical Results 
The results of the unit root tests for series of Exports (X), Imports (Q), Chinese GDP 
(GDP), U.S. GDP (GDP*), Chinese CPI (P), U.S. CPI (P*) and the yuan value per dollar (ε) 
using ADF are reported in Table 2.2.  The null hypothesis that the variables are non-stationary in 
level is not rejected across all variables.  However, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity in 
first-difference of variables is rejected for all variables.  Thus, all variables appear to be non-
stationary in level and stationary after first differencing. Using the method of Paulsen (1984), the 
optimal lags of VEC model are 4 lags in the export supply model and 2 lags in the import supply 
model. 
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 show that the results of the Johansen Cointegration tests for the 
export supply and import demand. In both models, the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests show 
that the null hypothesis of the absence of cointegrating relation (r = 0) can be rejected at 5% 
level of significance. Similarly, the null hypothesis of the existence of at most one cointegrating 
relation (r ≤1) cannot be rejected  at 5% level of significance. In short, both tests suggest the 
existence of one cointegrating vectors driving the series with four common stochastic trends in 
the data. Thus, we can conclude that the variables in both models are cointegrated. That is, there 
is a long-run relationship among the export supply (or import demand), exchange rate, price or 
income. In Table 2.5, the long term cointegrating vector suggests that Chinese exports have 
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causal relationships with U.S. income, U.S. domestic price and exchange rate. However, the 
VEC model does not support the long run relationships between Chinese imports and the 
exchange rate or China’s domestic prices. These results show that the exchange rate has no effect 
on imports in the long run. Thus, there is no need to estimate the relationship between China’s 
import demand and the exchange rate. The leading Chinese imports are electronic equipment, oil, 
and machinery, and demand for these industrial products tend to be price inelastic. Thus, only the 
coefficient of GDP is positive and significant at 1% confidence level. 
The estimated long-run relationship in the export supply function is 
 ˆ ˆ39.071 2.995ln * 13.733ln *ˆl 4.136ln n .GDPX P ε− − + +=  (27) 
The coefficients of U.S. domestic price and the exchange rate are positive. This implies that as 
the prices of China’s domestic goods rise and the yuan depreciates, China’s export supply 
increases. However, the coefficient of U.S. GDP is negative. This indicates that China’s 
exportable goods are inferior goods. That is, as U.S. GDP rises, U.S. imports of China’s export 
goods fall. Moreover, the results show that the elasticities of Chinese exports with respect to U.S 
GDP, U.S. domestic price, and the exchange rate are all greater than unity. For instance, a 1-
percent increase in the exchange rate and the domestic price level increases China’s exports by 
4.136% and 13.733%, respectively. Similarly, a 1-percent increase in U.S. GDP reduces China’s 
exports by 2.995%. 
All parameters are statistically significant at the 1-percent level. The estimated value of 
exports is given by 0 31 2ˆ ˆˆ ˆ* *ˆ e ,t t t tX GDP P
α αα α ε=  where 0αˆ , 1αˆ , 2αˆ ,and 3αˆ  are estimated parameters 
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in equation (19),  and e 2.71828= is the base of the natural logarithm. Since Chinese imports are 
mostly derived demands for industrial inputs, rather than consumption demands, we use China’s 
actual import data Q, instead of estimating the import demand function. In other words, China’s 
import demand is not responsive to changes in the exchange rates. Thus,  the estimated 
equilibrium exchange rate *tˆε  at time t that yields bilateral trade balance is derived from the 
condition,iii 0 31 2ˆ ˆˆ ˆ* *ˆ et t t t tX GDP P Q
α αα α ε= = , and is written as 
3
0 1 2
ˆ1/
*
ˆ ˆ ˆ* *ˆ ,et t t
Q
GDP P
α
α α αε
 
=  
 
 (28) 
From the estimated equilibrium exchange rates in (28) and actual exchange rates, the rate of 
devaluation in period t is given by  
ˆˆ ,
ˆ
t t
t
t
ε ε
δ
ε
 −
=  
 
 (29) 
 and the equivalent tariff rate in period t is given by 
ˆ
.ˆ1
t
t
t
δ
τ
δ
 
=   − 
(30) 
The quarterly equilibrium and actual exchange rates are shown in Table 2.6. For instance, 
in the fourth quarter of 1994, the actual exchange rate was 8.5, which indicates a 47.9 percent 
devaluation of the yuan below the equilibrium rate of 5.7. This undervaluation of the yuan is 
equivalent to an import tariff of 92.1 percent.  The rate of devaluation ranged from 21.7 percent 
25 
in the fourth quarter of 2013 to 63.9 percent in the first quarter of 2000. The corresponding tariff 
equivalent ranged from 27.8 percent to 176.8 percent during the same period. The average rate of 
devaluation from the equilibrium exchange rates was 45.1 percent, and the average of equivalent 
tariffs was 87.5 percent. 
2.8  Concluding Remarks 
While tariffs and non-tariff barriers are bound by various agreements in the WTO, there 
are no such agreements among countries on the bilateral exchange rates. The IMF tends to 
monitor only the exchange rates of developing countries that are beset by large balance of 
payments deficits. The WTO regulates only tariff and various non-tariff barriers, but has made 
little attempt to regulate the bilateral exchange rates because exchange rate practices are within 
the purview of the IMF. 
This paper has shown that yuan devaluations are equivalent to import tariffs in a two-
good, two-currency model of international trade and exchange rates. Even if no tariffs or quotas 
are employed, our analysis shows that a country can restrict imports by undervaluing its 
currency. Using the available yuan-dollar exchange rates and bilateral U.S.-China trade data, it is 
shown that during the period 1994 - 2015, China’s yuan has been grossly undervalued.  On 
average, the yuan was devalued by 45 percent, and the average of tariff equivalents of the 
undervalued yuan was 87.5 percent for the period 1994-2015. 
The finding that tariffs and the undervalued yuan have the same effects on domestic 
prices and import volumes suggests that currency pegging can be viewed as a trade policy. Either 
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the WTO or IMF could begin to consider regulation of currency practices of developing 
countries in the face of large trade imbalances between major trading countries. 
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Figure 2.1.  The Effect of Devaluation on Import Demand  
 
Figure 2.2.  The Effect of Devaluation on Export Supply 
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Table 2.1. Summary of the equivalence of tariffs and currency undervaluation 
.25 .25( , )U c z c z= , 
2 2 2 2 2 ,a C Z Kθ+ = 1,  * .25,  2,  1,  100.b P a Kθ= = = = =  
 
Currency Undervaluation 
.8ε = ( .2)δ =  
Equivalent Tariff 
(1 ) / .25t ε ε= − =  
General Case Special Case General Case Special Case 
Export Price b  1b =  b  1b =  
Import Price * /P Pδ ε=  5 /16 .313Pδ = =  (1 ) *
tP t P= +  5 /16 .313
tP = =  
Output C  2 2 2 2( )
K bC
a b a P
δ
δ
θ
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a b a P
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K aPZ
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δ
δ
δδ θ
=
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1 1 25 / 64
125 / 2 53
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GDP R  R bC P Zδ δ δ δ= +  42.40 (5 /16)53 58.96R
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tR = + =  
Expenditure 
I  
I Rδ δ=  58.96I δ =  t tI R=  58.96tI =  
Consumption 
c  2
Ic
b
δ
δ =
 
29.48cδ =  2
t
t Ic
b
=
 
29.48tc =  
Consumption 
z  2
Iz
P
δ
δ
δ=  
94.34zδ =  2
t
t
t
Iz
P
=
 
94.34tz =  
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Table 2.2. Unit root test results 
Variable X Q GDP GDP* P P* ε 
No time trend, No lag 
First-Difference -9.24 * -13.17* -12.47* -5.88* -6.28* -7.88* -4.51* 
Note: *indicates significance at 1% 
 
 
Table 2.3. Johansen test for Cointegration (Export Supply)  
 
Series: lnX lnGDP* lnP* lnε 
Maximum 
Rank LL eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
5% critical 
Value 
0 1068.35 ⋅ 52.427 47.21 
1 1083.97 0.314 21.194* 29.68 
2 1088.91 0.112 11.301 15.41 
3 1093.18 0.098 2.769 3.76 
4 1094.56 0.033   
 
 
Table 2.4. Johansen test for Cointegration (Import Demand)  
 
Series: lnQ lnGDP lnP lnε 
Maximum 
Rank LL eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
5% critical 
Value 
0 634.37 . 50.27 47.21 
1 649.59 0.30 19.8249* 29.68 
2 654.97 0.12 9.08 15.41 
3 659.34 0.10 0.32 3.76 
4 659.50 0.00   
 
Table 2.5. Parameter Estimates of Import and Export Functions 
 Constant lnGDP* ln GDP lnP* lnP ln ε 
ln(Export) -39.071 -2.995 (0.990) * - 
13.733 
(2.179)* - 
4.136 
(0.595) * 
ln(Import) -5.059 - 0.820 (0.245)* - - 
0.360 
(1.939) 
Note: *indicates significance at 1% 
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Table 2.6. Tariff Equivalents of Devalued Yuan 
Time ε   *tˆε   
*
*
ˆˆ
ˆ
t t
t
t
ε ε
δ
ε
 −
=  
 
 
ˆ
ˆ ˆ1
t
t
t
δ
τ
δ
 
=   − 
 
1994 Q1 8.724 5.771 0.512 1.048 
1994 Q2 8.684 6.095 0.425 0.738 
1994 Q3 8.558 6.431 0.331 0.494 
1994 Q4 8.503 5.748 0.479 0.921 
1995 Q1 8.448 5.889 0.435 0.768 
1995 Q2 8.321 6.016 0.383 0.621 
1995 Q3 8.337 6.125 0.361 0.565 
1995 Q4 8.335 6.241 0.335 0.505 
1996 Q1 8.350 5.868 0.423 0.733 
1996 Q2 8.342 5.630 0.482 0.930 
1996 Q3 8.334 5.815 0.433 0.764 
1996 Q4 8.329 5.642 0.476 0.910 
1997 Q1 8.326 5.588 0.490 0.960 
1997 Q2 8.322 5.624 0.480 0.922 
1997 Q3 8.317 5.794 0.436 0.772 
1997 Q4 8.310 6.155 0.350 0.539 
1998 Q1 8.308 5.970 0.392 0.644 
1998 Q2 8.310 5.561 0.494 0.977 
1998 Q3 8.306 5.708 0.455 0.835 
1998 Q4 8.278 6.493 0.275 0.379 
1999 Q1 8.279 5.250 0.577 1.365 
1999 Q2 8.278 5.487 0.509 1.035 
1999 Q3 8.277 5.487 0.508 1.034 
1999 Q4 8.279 5.456 0.518 1.073 
2000 Q1 8.279 5.052 0.639 1.768 
2000 Q2 8.277 5.406 0.531 1.132 
2000 Q3 8.279 5.682 0.457 0.842 
2000 Q4 8.277 5.492 0.507 1.028 
2001 Q1 8.278 5.052 0.638 1.766 
2001 Q2 8.277 5.124 0.615 1.601 
2001 Q3 8.277 5.177 0.599 1.491 
2001 Q4 8.276 5.380 0.538 1.166 
2002 Q1 8.277 5.302 0.561 1.279 
2002 Q2 8.277 5.129 0.614 1.588 
2002 Q3 8.277 5.317 0.557 1.256 
2002 Q4 8.278 5.363 0.544 1.191 
2003 Q1 8.277 5.297 0.563 1.287 
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Table 2.6 continued 
 
2003 Q2 8.277 5.312 0.558 1.263 
2003 Q3 8.277 5.278 0.568 1.317 
2003 Q4 8.277 5.733 0.444 0.798 
2004 Q1 8.277 5.544 0.493 0.973 
2004 Q2 8.277 5.405 0.531 1.134 
2004 Q3 8.277 5.345 0.548 1.215 
2004 Q4 8.277 5.453 0.518 1.074 
2005 Q1 8.277 5.261 0.573 1.343 
2005 Q2 8.277 5.362 0.544 1.191 
2005 Q3 8.092 5.328 0.519 1.078 
2005 Q4 8.076 5.407 0.493 0.974 
2006 Q1 8.035 5.212 0.542 1.182 
2006 Q2 8.004 5.240 0.528 1.117 
2006 Q3 7.933 5.334 0.487 0.950 
2006 Q4 7.822 5.555 0.408 0.689 
2007 Q1 7.737 5.279 0.466 0.871 
2007 Q2 7.633 5.088 0.500 1.001 
2007 Q3 7.521 5.069 0.484 0.937 
2007 Q4 7.368 5.189 0.420 0.724 
2008 Q1 7.072 4.999 0.415 0.709 
2008 Q2 6.899 4.704 0.467 0.876 
2008 Q3 6.831 4.642 0.472 0.892 
2008 Q4 6.854 5.003 0.370 0.587 
2009 Q1 6.836 4.601 0.486 0.944 
2009 Q2 6.833 4.671 0.463 0.862 
2009 Q3 6.828 4.600 0.484 0.939 
2009 Q4 6.828 4.918 0.388 0.634 
2010 Q1 6.826 4.884 0.398 0.660 
2010 Q2 6.818 4.806 0.419 0.721 
2010 Q3 6.740 4.956 0.360 0.562 
2010 Q4 6.650 5.255 0.265 0.361 
2011 Q1 6.565 4.850 0.353 0.547 
2011 Q2 6.475 4.626 0.400 0.666 
2011 Q3 6.389 4.612 0.385 0.626 
2011 Q4 6.348 4.884 0.300 0.428 
2012 Q1 6.313 4.623 0.365 0.576 
2012 Q2 6.363 4.543 0.401 0.669 
2012 Q3 6.320 4.537 0.393 0.647 
2012 Q4 6.233 4.817 0.294 0.416 
2013 Q1 6.215 4.593 0.353 0.546 
     
35 
 
 
Table 2.6 continued 
 
2013 Q2 6.134 4.477 0.370 0.588 
2013 Q3 6.120 4.432 0.381 0.615 
2013 Q4 6.074 4.989 0.217 0.278 
2014 Q1 6.0509 4.588 0.319 0.468 
2014 Q2 6.2246 4.329 0.438 0.779 
2014 Q3 6.1984 4.389 0.412 0.702 
2014 Q4 6.1251 4.874 0.257 0.345 
2015 Q1 6.2181 4.645 0.339 0.512 
2015 Q2 6.2010 4.485 0.382 0.619 
2015 Q3 6.2085 4.494 0.381 0.617 
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CHAPTER 3.  UNEMPLOYMENT AND OPTIMAL EXCHANGE RATE 
IN AN OPEN ECONOMY 
 
3.1  Abstract 
 
China has been criticized for adopting a low yuan policy to take unfair advantage of 
its trading partners. This paper considers the optimal exchange rate policy of a Keynesian 
open economy with unemployed resources. In the case of Cobb-Douglas utility and 
production functions, indirect utility is monotone-increasing and concave in the exchange 
rate. Yuan devaluation is shown to reduce unemployment. Moreover, the optimal exchange 
rate is one which guarantees full employment. The United States may want to choose a 
different rate which ensures full employment. The two countries could negotiate an 
intermediate exchange rate for which some unemployment exists in both countries. 
 
3.2.  Introduction 
 
 Due to its mounting currency reserves since the 1990s, China’s exchange rate policy 
has been under intense scrutiny. According to the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
of People’s Bank of China (PBC), China’s foreign exchange reserve was $22 billion in 1993.  
China’s foreign exchange reserve has since increased steadily, to $3.1 trillion in October 
2016. Such a dramatic rise in China’s cumulative trade surplus has provoked much debate 
concerning China’s currency valuation. 
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 Most major currencies except the renminbi are freely floating vis-à-vis other 
currencies, except the renminbi.  It is argued that China may be deliberately depressing the 
yuan in the hope of stimulating domestic production.  In the celebrated Mundell (1963)-
Fleming(1964) model, currency devaluation influences a country’s balance of payments, 
thereby affecting production and unemployment. In a study of ten countries, Gylfason and 
Schmid (1983) show that devaluation has positive output effects.   
 In an open economy, the government may be more interested in the output effects of 
currency devaluation. Helpman (1976) considered a single-period framework with a 
nontraded good and showed that devaluation increases employment, while Cuddington 
(1981) investigated the contemporaneous effect of devaluation. More recently, Batra and 
Beladi (2013) suggest that both China and Japan kept their currency values low relative to 
those of other nations such as the United States and Europe in order to maintain 
unemployment below a target rate.iv Jin and Choi (2013) noted that while some profits might 
be generated in the short run by slightly deviating from the equilibrium exchange rates, 
excessive hoarding of reserve assets in the long run can only result in losses to PBC’s 
balance of payment account. Jin et al (2016) showed that in a two-period model 
nonintervention is the optimal exchange rate policy. However, the prevailing view is that 
China has intentionally depressed the value of the yuan to gain unfair advantages in the 
global market. (Cheung et al., 2009; Cheung, 2012) 
 In a developing country like China, the goal of keeping the unemployment rate low 
might take precedence over other economic issues. Reducing unemployment may be the 
principal motive for adopting the low yuan policy. For instance, Overholt (2010) argues that 
yuan appreciation would increase China’s unemployment. Developing countries often 
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encourage trade surpluses to prepare for future contingencies. Goldstein and Lardy (2006) 
suggest that China’s undervaluation of the renminbi contributed to growing trade surpluses. 
Also, China wants the renminbi to be an international reserve currency, but the Chinese 
government is reluctant to make the yuan fully convertible. 
 This paper investigates the optimal exchange rate for a Keynesian open economy.v 
Open-economy macroeconomic models are predominantly based on an economy producing a 
single homogeneous good.vi  Frenkel and Ros (2006) developed an unemployment model in 
which countries produce a nontraded good and a traded good to analyze the effect of 
exchanges on unemployment. Vasylenko and Vasylenko (2005) first considered the 
conditions for trade balance stabilization with two traded sectors. The present paper’s main 
contribution is to analyze the effect of currency devaluation on unemployment and welfare in 
an open economy which produces two tradable goods. Currency devaluation changes the 
relative price of the exportable. Trade is balanced and hence no currency misalignment 
occurs.vii Using the Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions, we show that under 
certain conditions, the exchange rate which guarantees full employment is the optimal policy. 
 Section 3.2 introduces the basic two-sector, two-country model with unemployment. 
Section 3.3 investigates the effect of yuan devaluation on exchange rate pass-through into the 
yuan price of China’s exportable good. Section 3.4 considers the effect of yuan devaluation 
on income and welfare, while Section 3.5 explores the effect on unemployment. Section 3.6 
offers a numerical example to illustrate the main propositions. Section 3.7 provides 
concluding remarks. 
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3.3. The Two-Sector Keynesian Model with Unemployment   
 In this section we consider a Keynesian open economy model with two goods to 
consider China’s optimal exchange rate policy. Let China’s importable good Z be the 
numéraire, i.e., its dollar price * 1=P , and let δ denote the yuan price of the dollar. Exchange 
rate pass-through into the import price is perfect, viii and the yuan price of the importable is 
.P  An increase in δ  represents an increase in the yuan price of the dollar, and hence a yuan 
depreciation. We assume that the dollar price of the importable good P* is fixed in the 
importing country, and its yuan price is *P P δ= , where δ is the yuan price of the dollar.  
 Each country is assumed to fix the price of its exportable in terms of its own 
currency. That is, the yuan price of good C, which China exports, is b, while its dollar price 
is denoted by *b . Likewise, the dollar price P* of good Z is fixed, equal to unity. The yuan 
price of good Z is denoted by P. The relative price of good Z in China can be written as: 
* * *.
/ *
P P P P
b b b b
δ
δ
= = =  That is, the relative price of good Z is the same in both countries, 
regardless of the exchange rate. However, a change in the exchange rate may affect the 
relative price of good Z.   
 
Assumptions 
 We now consider a two-sector Keynesian model of two countries producing two 
goods, C and Z. Unemployment exists in both the capital and labor markets. The wage rate w 
and capital rental r are assumed to be fixed in the short run.  As a basis for analyzing the 
effects of yuan devaluation, we employ the following assumptions: 
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(i) Two factors, capital K and labor L, are used to produce two goods, C and Z. China 
is assumed to export C and import Z.ix  
(ii) The dollar price of good Z is normalized, i.e., * 1.P =   
(iii) The Chinese government pegs the yuan to the dollar, and the yuan price of the 
importable is * .P P δ δ= =   
(iv) Cobb-Douglas production functions are used in both industries. 
(v) Unemployment exists in both capital and labor markets. 
(vi) Consumer preferences are represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function in both 
countries. 
China  
 China produces two goods, using two factors: capital (K) and labor (L) inputs. 
Domestic outputs of the traded goods are given by 1 1( , ) ,C C C C CC F L K A L K
α β= = and 
2 2( , )Z Z Z Z ZZ G L K A L K
α β= = , where jL  and jK  denote the amounts of labor and capital inputs 
employed in sector  j = C, Z. Both production functions are assumed to exhibit decreasing 
returns to scale (DRS), i.e., 1 1 1,α β+ <  and 2 2 1.α β+ <  DRS implies that the production 
functions (.)F  and (.)G are monotone-increasing and concave.x  
 
China’s Supplies of Tradable Goods 
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 Since labor and capital inputs are not fully employed and are immobile 
internationally, *w w≠  and *.r r≠  Let CΠ  and ZΠ  denote the profits of industries, C and 
Z, respectively. Total profit of the Chinese economy in yuan is 
 1 1 2 2 ,C Z C C C Z Z Z C C Z ZbA L K PA L K wL rK wL rK
α β α βΠ = Π +Π = + − − − −   (31) 
where b and P are the yuan prices of goods C and Z, ,iL  and iK are input demands of labor 
and capital in sector i = C, Z. Let L  and K  denote China’s labor and capital endowments. 
The central planner’s problem is to choose , , ,C Z CL L K  and ZK  subject to 
, .C Z C ZL L L K K K+ < + <  Due to unemployment, a production mix of C and Z does not 
occur along a production possibility frontier (PPF). The first order conditions are 
 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
1 1
1 1
1 1
2 2
, ,
, .
C C C C C C
Z Z Z Z Z Z
b A L K w b A L K r
P A L K w P A L K r
α β α β
α β α β
α β
α β
− −
− −
= =
= =
  (32) 
The input demands for labor and capital in the production of the two goods are as follows:  
 
1 1 1 11 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 22 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )1 1
2 2 2 2
1 1
, ,
, .
C C
C C
Z Z
Z Z
b A b AL K
w r w r
P A P AL K
w r w r
α β α ββ β α α
β β α α
α β α ββ β α α
β β α α
α β α β
α β α β
− − − −− −
− −
− − − −− −
− −
   
= =   
   
   
= =   
   
  (33)   
The optimal supplies of goods, C and Z, are functions of factor prices, w and r: 
 
1 11 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
2 22 2 2 2
2 2
2 2
1/(1 )
1 1
1/(1 )
2 2
( , ) ,
Z( , ) .
C
C C C
Z
Z Z Z
b AC b P A L K
w r
P Ab P A L K
w r
α βα β α β
α β
α β
α βα β α β
α β
α β
α β
α β
− −+
− −+
 
= =  
 
 
= =  
 
  (34)  
42 
 
 
China’s Demands for Tradable Goods 
The preferences of Chinese consumers are represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function,  
 1( , ) ,U c z c zγ γ−=   (35) 
where c  and z  are China’s consumption of the exportable and importable, respectively.xi 
The equilibrium condition for optimal consumption is: 
 ,c
z
U b
U P
=  (36) 
where b and P are the yuan prices of exportable good C and importable good Z, respectively. 
Thus, consumer demands for the two goods are written as: Ic
b
γ
=  and (1 ) ,Iz
P
γ−
=  
where I is China’s income in yuan. Since both factors are unemployed and the total profit is 
distributed to consumers, the total income of China is 
( ) ( ) .C Z C ZI w L L r K K bC PZ= + + + +Π = +  The budget constraint in yuan is given by:  
 .bc Pz I+ =  (37) 
China’s national income is  
 
1 1 2 21 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
1 1 2 2 .C Zb A P AI bC PZ
w r w r
α β α βα β α β
α β α β
α β α β
− − − −
   
= + = +   
  
  (38) 
 Suppose China lends S dollars to the United States. Then China’s expenditure in yuan 
is   
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1 1 2 21 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
1 1 2 2 .C Zb A P AI
w r w r
α β α βα β α β
α β α β
α β α β
− − − −
   
= +   
  
  (39) 
China’s consumer demands for two tradable goods are written as:  
 
1 1 2 22 21 1 2 21 1
2 2
1 1 2 2
1 1 22 21 1 2 21 1
2 2
1 1 2 2
1
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )1
11 1 2 2
1
1/(1 ) 1/(11
11 1 2 2
,
(1 )
C Z
C Z
A Abc
b w r w r
A Abz
w r w r
α β α βα βα β α βα β
α β
α β α β
α β αα βα β α βα β
α β
α β α β
α β α βδγ δ
δ
α β α β
γ δ
δ
− − − −+− −
− −
− − − −+− −
− −
 
    = +    
   
 
   
= − +   
  
2 )
.
β 
 
 
 
 
 (40) 
United States  
 The United States also is assumed to produce the two goods, using two factors, 
capital (K) and labor (L) inputs. Since both inputs are unemployed, production does not occur 
on the PPF. Recall that the United States and China use the same technologies in the 
production of two goods, C and Z. U.S. outputs of the tradable goods are given by 
1 1* ** ** ( , ) ,C C C C CC F L K A L K
α β= = and 2 2* ** ** ( , )Z Z Z Z ZZ G L K A L K
α β= = , where *jL  and 
*
jK  denote 
the labor and capital inputs employed in sector j = C*, Z*.   
U.S. Supplies of Tradable Goods 
 Let * *CΠ  and 
*
*ZΠ denote U.S. profits of industries C* and Z*. The total U.S. profit in 
dollars is:  
 1 1 2 2* * * ** * * * * ** * * * * ** * * *( ) *( ),C Z C C C Z Z Z C Z C Zb A L K P A L K w L L r K K
α β α βΠ = Π +Π = + − + − +  (41) 
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where b* and * 1P =  are dollar prices of good C and Z, and *iL  and 
*
iK are input demands of 
labor and capital in sector  i = C*, Z*. Let *L  and *K  denote the U.S. endowments of labor 
and capital inputs. The central planner’s problem is to choose * * *, , ,C Z CL L K  and 
*
ZK  to 
maximize the total profit in (41) subject to * * * **, *.C Z C ZL L L K K K+ < + <  
 The first order conditions are 
 
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2
* 1 * * * 1
1 1
* 1 * * * 1
2 2
* *, * *,
* *, * *.
C C C C C C
Z Z Z Z Z Z
b A L K w b A L K r
P A L K w P A L K r
α β α β
α β α β
α β
α β
− −
− −
= =
= =
  (42) 
U.S. input demands are given by 
 
1 1 1 11 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 22 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )1 1
* *1 1 1 1
1 1
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )1 1
* *2 2 2 2
1 1
* *, ,
* * * *
* *, .
* * * *
C C
C C
Z Z
Z Z
b A b AL K
w r w r
P A P AL K
w r w r
α β α ββ β α α
β β α α
α β α ββ β α α
β β α α
α β α β
α β α β
− − − −− −
− −
− − − −− −
− −
   
= =   
   
   
= =   
   
  (43)  
The optimal supplies are: 
 
1 11 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
2 22 2 2 2
2 2
2 2
1/(1 )
* * 1 1
1/(1 )
* * 2 2
**( *, *) ,
* *
*Z*( *, *) .
* *
C
C C C
Z
Z Z Z
b AC b P A L K
w r
P Ab P A L K
w r
α βα β α β
α β
α β
α βα β α β
α β
α β
α β
α β
− −+
− −+
 
= =  
 
 
= =  
 
  (44)  
U.S. Demands for Tradable Goods 
Preferences of American consumers are represented by a utility function, 
1( *, *) ( *) ( *) ,U c z c zγ γ−=  where *c  and *z  are the U.S. demands for C and Z, respectively. 
The national income of the United States is 
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* * * ** *( ) *( ) * * * * *.C Z C ZI w L L r K K b C P Z= + + + +Π = +  The U.S. expenditure in dollars is 
given by:  
 * * * * * * * * *,b c P z I b C P Z+ = = +  (45) 
where b* and P* are the dollar prices of C* and Z*, respectively. 
 Revenue from production is  
 
1 1 2 21 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
1 1 2 2* ** * * * * .
* * * *
C Zb A P AI b C P Z
w r w r
α β α βα β α β
α β α β
α β α β
− − − −
   
= + = +   
  
  (46) 
The total U.S. expenditure of the United States is   
 
1 1 2 21 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
1 1 2 2* ** .
* * * *
C Zb A P AI
w r w r
α β α βα β α β
α β α β
α β α β
− − − −
   
= +   
  
  (47) 
The equilibrium condition for optimal consumption is: 
 *
*
* .
*
c
z
U b
U P
=  (48) 
 U.S. consumer demands satisfying the equilibrium condition in (48) and the budget 
constraint in (46) are written as:  
 
1 1 2 21 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 21 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
1 1 2 2
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
1 1 2 2
* ** ,
* * * * * *
* *1 1* ,
* * * * * *
C Z
C Z
b A P Ac
b w r b w r
b A P Az
P w r P w r
α β α βα β α β
α β α β
α β α βα β α β
α β α β
α β α βγ γ
α β α βγ γ
− − − −
− − − −
   
= +   
  
   − −
= +   
  
  (49) 
where w* and r* are the wage rate and capital rent, respectively. 
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World Market Equilibrium and Trade Balance 
Recall that the relative price of the exportable is / / .b P b δ=  A competitive 
equilibrium is attained when producers and consumers in both markets behave as price takers. 
Recall that when unemployment exists in the labor market, any increases in K  or L have no 
effect on China’s domestic outputs. Note that due to unemployment the supply of each good 
depends on its own price, but not on the price of the other good. Thus, the supply functions 
are written as: ( )C C b=  and ( ).Z Z P=   
 The market clearing condition for good C is written as: 
 ( , , ) *( , , *) ( , ) *( , ).c b I c b I C b C bδ δ δ δ+ = +   (50) 
Despite unemployment in the factor markets, a Keynesian equilibrium exists when aggregate 
demand equals aggregate supply in each sector. The labor market imperfection only causes 
labor unemployment, but does not preclude the working of Walras’ Law in the output 
markets. Thus, all outputs produced are sold at the equilibrium prices. Walras’ Law suggests 
that if the market for good C is in equilibrium, the market for the other output, Z, also is in 
equilibrium, i.e.,  
 ( , , ) *( , , *) ( , ) *( , ).b I z b I Z b Z bz δ δ δ δ+ = +   (51) 
Thus, there exists a unique value of δ which clears the market for good C in (50). Note that 
when capital is not fully utilized, / 0Z K∂ ∂ = . Likewise, when labor unemployment exists, 
/ 0.Z L∂ ∂ =  The same conditions hold if capital and labor are not fully employed in the 
United States, i.e., * / * * / * 0.Z K Z L∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ =   
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Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
 Let ( , )b δ  be a pair of yuan prices at the competitive benchmark equilibrium 
satisfying (50).xii Then by Walras’ law, the price pair ( , )b δ  also satisfies (51). That is, if the 
market for good C clears for given prices ( , )b δ , the other product market (i.e., for good Z) 
also clears. Substituting (34), (40), (44) and (49) into (50), we obtain the world market 
clearing condition for good C:  
 
1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 22 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )1 1 1 1
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )1
12 2 2 2
(1/ )
* *
.
(1 ) * * (1 )
C C
Z Z
b A Ab b
w r w r
A A
w r w r
α β α βα β α β α β
α β α β
α β α β
α β α βα β α β
α β
α β α β
α β δ α β
α β α βγ γδ δ
γ γ
− − − −+
− − − −
− − − −
− −
   
+   
   
   
= +   − −   
  (52) 
Since good Z is the numéraire, * 1,P =  we have ,P δ= and * .b b δ=  Since the dollar price of 
the numéraire is fixed, its yuan price bears the full burden of adjustment and exchange rate 
pass-through into import price is complete. Recall that China and the United States have 
identical technologies, and in the absence of trade barriers, output prices are equalized. The 
equilibrium yuan price of good C is:xiii  
1 12 2 2 21 1 2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2
1 11 11 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
(1 )1/(1 ) 1/(1 )(1 ) 1
1 2 2 2 2
1/(1 ) 1/
1
1 1 1 1
1 * *
( )
1
* *
Z Z
C C
A A
w r w r
b
A A
w r w r
α βα β α βα β α β α β
α β
α β α β
α βα βα β α βα β
α β α β
α β α βγ δ δ
γ
δ
α β α β
δ
− −− − − −− −
− −
+− −
− −
       +      −      =
    +    
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1 1
1 1
(1 )
(1 )
.α β
α β
− −
− − 
 
 
 
 (53) 
  
The equilibrium dollar price of good C is:xiv  
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(54) 
Thus, both the yuan and dollar prices of good C depend on the exchange rate, δ . 
3.4. Devaluation and Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
We now consider the effect of yuan devaluation on the yuan and dollar prices of the 
exportable good C. Yuan devaluation is represented by an increase in δ, which raises the 
yuan price P of good Z. Differentiating (53) with respect to ,δ  we have 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
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 
 
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(55) 
where 
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If both industries exhibit DRS ( 1 1 1α β+ <   and 2 2 1α β+ < ), then / 0.db dδ >  If b rises 
proportionately, then / *b bδ =  is constant; i.e., yuan devaluation has no effect on the dollar 
price of good C.  
 Jacob and Uusküla (2016) observed that exchange rate pass-through is not only 
incomplete but also diminishing, and “the firm will resist transmitting exchange rate 
fluctuation to the sales price, and instead partially absorb the currency fluctuation into the 
price markup.” Gopinath et al. (2010) observed that the life-long pass-through rate is almost 
complete (0.98), and higher than the short-run pass-through rate for non-dollar priced goods 
(0.95).  This observation suggests that in the short run the yuan export price decreasingly 
reflects the exchange rate changes (i.e., exchange rate pass-through becomes less and less 
complete) as the yuan appreciates. 
Thus, we assume that b rises with δ, but less than proportionately. Differentiating (54) 
with respect to δ  yields 
 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
1 1
1 1 1 1
(1 )
1 1
0 3 2 4(2 ) ( )
0 2
(1 )
*( ) *( ) 1 ,
b b
A A A A
A A
α β
α β α β
γα β
δ δ γ
δ δ
− −
− − +
 
− −  ∂ ∂ − = = −
∂ ∂
  
 where iA ’s are functions of δ as follows:    
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If both industries exhibit the same DRS ( 2 2 1 1α β α β+ = + ), then devaluation of the yuan has 
no effect on the relative price of the good C , ( / ) 0.d b
d
δ
δ
=  If industry C exhibits higher 
returns to scale than industry Z ( 1 1 2 2α β α β+ > + ), and the U.S. wage and capital rent are 
higher than those in China ( * ,w wδ ≥ and *r rδ ≥ ), then 3 2 4 0oA A A A− < ,xv and 
( / ) 0d b
d
δ
δ
< . 
This implies that the dollar price of good C decreases with δ, i.e., * / 0.db dδ <  Figure 1 
illustrates the case where the dollar price of good C decreases with δ until the full 
employment rate fδ  is reached, and remains constant because exchange rate pass-through 
into the export price is perfect. 
Let oδ  denote the benchmark equilibrium value of δ, at which the market for good C 
clears when producers and consumers in both countries behave as price takers. In the absence 
of government intervention, the benchmark equilibrium also means trade is balanced between 
the two countries. If China devalues the yuan from the benchmark equilibrium rate, then the 
yuan price of good C increases. We assume that the yuan price of good C increases at a 
decreasing rate, i.e., '( ) 0,b δ >  and "( ) 0.b δ < xvi 
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Once full employment is reached, it can be shown that the dollar price of good C is 
constant,  
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+      + −     
 
 (56) 
where K  and L  are fixed endowments of China’s capital and labor inputs, and *K  and *L  
are U.S. endowments of the same inputs. Thus, once full employment is reached, a further 
increase in δ has no effect on the dollar price of good C, i.e., * / ( / ) / 0.db d d b dδ δ δ= =  
If 1 1 2 2 ,α β α β+ > +  yuan devaluation lowers the dollar price of good C, which 
increases China’s exports. If 1 1 2 2 ,α β α β+ = +  yuan devaluation has no effect on the terms 
of trade. On the other hand, if 1 1 2 2 ,α β α β+ < + yuan devaluation raises the relative price of 
good C and may defeat the purpose of reducing unemployment. 
3.5. Yuan Devaluation, Income and Welfare 
 
Devaluation and GDP 
We now consider the effect of yuan devaluation on national income. Let I denote the 
yuan value of China’s outputs, i.e., 
 1 1 2 21 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
1/(1 ) 1/(1 )1 1
1 11 1 2 2
( , ) ( , )
.C Z
I bC b P PZ b P
A Ab
w r w r
α β α βα β α β
α β α β
α β α β
α β α β
δ
− − − −
− − − −
= +
   
= +   
  
  (57) 
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Differentiating (57) with respect to δ  yields  
 
1 1 2 21 1 2 21 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
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1 0.
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C ZA AdI b
d w r w r
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δ α β
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− − − −   = + >   − −   
 (58) 
Thus, the yuan value of China’s national income rises with δ.  
 
Devaluation and Welfare 
 Next, consider the effect of a yuan devaluation on consumer welfare, using (38) and 
(53), and the Cobb-Douglas utility function in (35). Given the demand functions in (40), the 
indirect utility of the Chinese consumers is given by 
 ( )( , , ( )) ( , , ( )), ( , , ( )) .V b I U c b I z b Iδ δ δ δ δ δ≡  (59) 
 We now explore whether China gains from yuan devaluation. Differentiating (59) with 
respect to δ, and using Roy’s identities, b IV V c= −  and P IV V z= − , we obtain 
 
( )
( )
( )
( / ) '( )
( / ) '( ) ' '( ) '( )
( ) '( ) ( ) ' '( ) '( ) ,
b P I
b P I
I
dV V db d V V I
d
V db d V V b C Z bb C b Z
V C c b Z z bb C b Z
δ δ
δ
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ
= + +
= + + + + +
= − + − + +
  (60) 
where ' '( ) '( )bb C b Zθ δ δ≡ + represents the change in national income resulting from a 
reduction in unemployment through a change in the exchange rate. Once full employment is 
reached, 0.θ =  Thus, as δ approaches fδ , ( )θ δ  must converge to 0. Thus, we assume that 
'( ) 0.θ δ <  Therefore, (60) is written as 
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  (61) 
Note that θ  is the income effect on welfare resulting from using idle resources, which 
is always positive, while ( ' / )X b b δ−  is the price effect of yuan devaluation on welfare. A 
rise in the price of imports, P δ= , reduces utility, and the price effect is negative. If the 
income effect dominates the negative price effect, then 0o
dV
d δδ
>  when evaluated at oδ , 
i.e., yuan devaluation initially increases consumer welfare. If unemployment exists in China, 
then ( ) / ' *bdb d b bδ δ
δ
= < = . Assume that there is a unique solution *δ in the interval 
( , ]o fδ δ  to the utility maximization problem. From (61), *δ  satisfies the first order 
condition, 
 ( )( ) '( ) 0.I
dV bV X b
d
δδ δ θ
δ δ
  = − + =  
  
  (62) 
Recall that once full employment is reached, 0,θ =  and from (56), b* is constant and 
( )'( ) 0.bb δδ
δ
− =  Thus, fδ  satisfies (62). Differentiating (62) with respect to ,δ  we obtain 
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 When evaluated at fδ , 
2
2
d V
dδ
 reduces to  
 ( )
2
2 ( ) ''( ) '( ) 0,I
d V V X b
d
δ δ θ δ
δ
= + <   
which implies that the indirect utility is concave in δ. Thus, fδ  is the optimal solution. 
 
Proposition 1: Assume that " 0b < . Then China’s optimal policy is yuan devaluation until 
full employment is reached.  
 
An important policy implication of this proposition is that yuan devaluation initially 
proves consumer welfare. When unemployment is high, the positive income effect of 
currency devaluation probably will dominate any negative price effect. Thus, yuan 
devaluation is likely to improve consumer welfare. Moreover, there is no optimal exchange 
rate that maintains a moderate rate of unemployment.  
Figure 3.2 illustrates that China’s optimal policy is yuan devaluation, raising δ above 
oδ . Since the indirect utility is monotone-increasing, δ can be raised to its upper limit, fδ , 
thereby reaching a maximum utility. A further increase in δ does not affect the dollar price of 
good C, because the exchange rate pass-through into the export price is perfect.  
Chen (2014) showed that in the case of China, from 1995 to 2007, exchange rate 
pass-through into the (long-term) export price was 42.6 percent. This finding suggests that 
China has not pursued the optimal exchange rate policy, and has devalued the yuan below the 
full employment rate, fδ . 
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3.6. Yuan Devaluation and Unemployment 
 We now consider the effect of yuan devaluation on unemployment. The number of 
unemployed workers is  
 1 1 2 21 1 2 2
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  (63)  
Once the full employment exchange rate fδ is reached, the labor constraint is binding, i.e., 
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Differentiating (63) with respect to δ  yields 
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This implies that a yuan devaluation reduces labor unemployment. Thus, there is some merit 
in the argument that China is undervaluing renminbi to reduce its domestic unemployment.  
 Proposition 2: Assume the Cobb-Douglas production in Section 2. Then a yuan 
devaluation reduces China’s domestic unemployment. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the effect of yuan devaluation in the presence of unemployment 
in China. The initial benchmark equilibrium occurs at point 0, where both K and L are 
unemployed and which is inside the PPF, labeled BBˈ. Note that yuan devaluation affects the 
relative yuan price of good C. In this case, the supplies of C and Z rise, which causes 
movement from point 0 to 1 inside the PPF. Yuan devaluation always raises domestic 
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production of both goods in so far as unemployment exists. Thus, China’s optimal policy is 
to choose δ  to eliminate unemployment until production occurs at point 2 along the PPF, i.e., 
.
( )
f
fb b
δ δ
δ
=   
Consider an alternative scenario in which capital is fully utilized at point 0, but 
unemployment exists in the labor market. Note that the supply of good Z increases with δ.  
An increase in δ not only raises the yuan price of good C, but also raises the shadow price of 
capital. The latter effect partly offsets the former effect. Thus, the supply response of good C 
is likely to be less pronounced than when unemployment exists in both factor markets.xvii  
3.7. Numerical Example 
 Since there is no tariff, the yuan price of the importable is * .P P δ δ= =  The price of 
the exportable good C is b and its dollar price of good C is *.b  
China and the United States 
 The United States and China are assumed to have identical production functions for 
the traded goods, C and Z: .45 .15( , ) 1.3C F L K L K= =  and .3 .1( , ) .Z G L K L K= =   Assume that 
factor prices in China are: .7w =  and 1r = , and in the Unites States: * 1w =  and * 0.7r = . 
Labor and capital endowments are 4L =  and 1K =  in China and * 1L =  and * 3K =  in the 
United States. Direct utility functions of the Chinese and U.S. consumers are represented by 
.4( , ) ( )u c z cz=  and .4( *, *) ( * *) .u c z c z=  
From the world market clearing condition in equation (54), we obtain the optimal 
yuan and dollar prices of good C: 
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Thus, as δ increases, the dollar price of good C , *( ),b δ  decreases.  
 China’s consumer demands for the two tradable goods are written as:  
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China’s consumer welfare is measured by the indirect utility, 
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 (64) 
 We now determine whether China gains from a yuan devaluation. Mathematica was 
used to generate Figure 4, which shows the impacts of yuan devaluation on the yuan and 
dollar prices of good C, national income, indirect utility, and labor and capital 
unemployment. When 2.44δ ≈ , both capital and labor inputs are fully utilized and 
maximum utility is attained. Until fδ  is reached, the exchange rate pass-through into the 
yuan price is imperfect, i.e., ' / .b b δ<  Once fδ  is reached, a further increase in δ does not 
affect the dollar price of good C, *.b   
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3.8. Concluding Remarks 
 
 This paper investigates the optimal exchange rate policy for a two-sector, Keynesian 
open economy. A Cobb-Douglas utility function is used to investigate China’s optimal 
exchange rate policy. In the plausible scenario where capital rents are equalized ( *)r rδ= , 
China’s wage is lower than the U.S. wage ( *)w wδ< ,  and industry C exhibits higher returns 
to scale than industry Z ( 1 1 2 2α β α β+ > + ) , then the indirect utility function is monotone-
increasing and concave in δ, which guarantees the existence of an optimal exchange rate. 
 China has been widely criticized for keeping the yuan low in order to take advantage 
of its trading partners. However, this paper suggests that instead China may have pursued the 
low yuan policy to reduce domestic unemployment. In the case of the Cobb-Douglas utility 
function, China’s optimal exchange rate is that rate which guarantees full employment. Such 
a policy cannot be criticized as deliberately devaluing the yuan to take unfair advantage of 
China’s trading partners. China may be preoccupied with reducing domestic unemployment. 
 This paper demonstrates that yuan devaluation reduces unemployment. Given the 
diminishing exchange rate pass-through into export price ( "( ) 0b δ < ), China’s optimal 
exchange rate is that rate which yields full employment. The model is limited in scope as it 
assumes a balance of trade between two trading countries, and does not explicitly consider 
trade imbalance. 
Given the plausible assumption of a concave indirect utility function in the exchange rate, the 
paper also shows that there is no optimal exchange rate that allows some unemployment. 
From the U.S. perspective, there exists another exchange rate *δ  that guarantees full 
employment in the United States. This rate is lower than the rate fδ that guarantees full 
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employment in China. Instead of permitting the trading partner to set its own optimal 
exchange rate, the two countries could negotiate an intermediate exchange rate, which lies 
somewhere between the two optimal exchange rates, *δ  and .fδ  To date, the United States 
has permitted China to choose its optimal rate, .fδ  
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Figure 3.1. Yuan Devaluation and Terms of Trade 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Yuan Devaluation and Indirect Utility 
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Figure 3.3. Yuan Devaluation and Output Effects 
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Figure 3.4. Effects on Yuan Devaluation 
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Table 3.1. Variables in China and the United States 
Variables of China 
C Producer supply of exportable good Z 
Producer supply of 
importable good CK  
Capital demand for 
Good C 
b Yuan price of good C P 
Yuan price of good 
Z ZK  
Capital demand for 
Good Z 
c Consumer demand for exportable good z 
Consumer demand 
for importable good K  Capital endowment 
w Wage rate r Capital rent CL  
Labor demand for 
good C 
CΠ  Profit of industry C  ZΠ  Profit of industry Z ZL  
Labor demand for 
good Z 
I Gross income N Unemployment L  Labor endowment 
U Utility V Indirect Utility R Gross domestic product 
Variables of the United States 
C* Producer supply of importable good Z* 
Producer supply of 
exportable good 
*
CK  
Capital demand for 
Good C 
b* Dollar price of good C P* 
Dollar price of good 
Z 
*
ZK  
Capital demand for 
Good Z 
c* Consumer demand for importable good z* 
Consumer demand 
for exportable good K * Capital endowment 
w* Wage rate r* Capital rent *CL  
Labor demand for 
good C 
*
CΠ  Profit of industry C  
*
ZΠ  Profit of industry Z 
*
ZL  
Labor demand for 
good Z 
I* Gross income R* Gross domestic product L * Labor endowment 
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CHAPTER 4.  PUBLIC CAPITAL AND OPTIMAL TARIFF 
 
4.1  Abstract 
 
 The objective of this paper is to address the relationship between the government 
expenditure in public capital stock and economic growth and examine an optimal import 
tariff for increase in public capital stock in a small open economy. The study provides 
theoretical model of the positive impacts of public capital on production sector. It also 
evaluates the effects of private capital investment on the export sector for labor and capital 
formation and identifies the contribution of public capital and other economic factors to the 
productivity growth rate in the firm sector. We show that the optimal tariffs are positive but 
decreases to the steady state level. Since the initial public and private capital stocks are lower 
than the levels of the steady state, the representative household spend more time to produce 
the exportable goods to obtain higher income compare to the level of the steady state. 
Increases in the public and private capital stock drops the share of labor in the export sector 
and the consumer spend his/her time on the home good sector. 
4.2.  Introduction 
 
 In many developing counties, lack of public infrastructures such as highways, 
transportation, power and water system is slowing economic growth because the 
infrastructure systems are crucial input factors for domestic production. Public investment 
plays an important role and a major policy issue in developing countries. A number of studies 
support that public capital has a powerful impact on the productivity of private capital. 
Aschauer (1989) insists the public capital is more important in determining productivity. 
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Barro (1990) also finds a positive relationship between public investment and output growth. 
Recently, they found that the public capital stock and economic growth is significantly 
connected especially in small income countries. 
 In the theoretical literature, government expenditure is introduced as an argument in 
the production function as an externality in production. This approach of including public 
capital in a private production function was proposed in Arrow and Kurz (1970) and all 
government investment was used for productions in the private sector. To invest in public 
capital, government uses two types of policies: domestic policy (income taxes or 
consumption tax) or international policy (import tariff) to finance government expenditure. 
Barro (1990) develops a simple model of endogenous growth in which the government uses 
tax revenue and found that all government spending was productive. Abe (1990, 1992) 
examined the theory of tariff reform in a small open economy. He examined that if the public 
production is complementary with the private goods, then the reduce tariffs increases welfare. 
However, if public production uses public inputs, then the welfare effect of lowering tariff is 
not clear. 
 The objective of this paper is to address the relationship between the government 
expenditure in public capital stock and economic growth and examine an optimal import 
tariff for increase in public capital stock in a small open economy. This practice explains 
rationale for government provision of public goods based on the market failure, internalizes 
externalities in the private production function. Moreover, the paper is alternatively 
answering "Why does the government devalue its own currency and change the terms of 
trade in the short run? " The effect of change in exchange rate is the similar to that of import 
tariffs which changes the relative price in domestic economy. This distortion of government 
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policy discourages current consumptions for import goods and encourage consumptions of 
home goods and capital investments. 
 We consider a small open economy with three types of agents: household, firm and 
government. The household saves in the form of capital and lends to the firm, and produces a 
nontraded good or home good with only labor. The firm borrows labor and capital and 
produces an export good given public capital. The government imposes an import tariff to 
finance public service or public capital which is an input in the tradable output sector. The 
paper begins by deriving the equilibrium in a social planning problem, characterizing its 
steady-state and dynamic properties. The effects of import tariff shocks in such an economy 
are analyzed. An important aspect of our analysis concerns the design of an optimal tariff 
policy in an economy with gradually accumulating public capital.  
 We assume discrete time, infinite time-horizons and perfect foresight. The 
government chooses the path of the tax rate once and for all on date 0 by taking into account 
the competitive equilibrium. First, we present the competitive equilibrium and then solve the 
primal problem. Our framework builds on the approach to optimal taxation. This approach 
characterizes the set of allocations that can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with 
distorting taxes by two simple conditions: a resource constraint and an implementability 
constraint. The implementability constraint is the household budget constraint in which the 
first-order conditions are used to substitute out for tariff policies. Thus both constraints 
depend only on allocations. The 
study provides theoretical model of the positive impacts of public capital on production 
sector. It also evaluates the effects of private capital investment on the export sector for labor 
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and capital formation and identifies the contribution of public capital and other economic 
factors to the productivity growth rate in the firm sector. 
 Section 2 introduces the basic economic model with public capital stock and import 
tariffs. Section 3 investigates the optimal tariff rates through the primal approach. Section 4 
suggests the algorithm to computing the optimal import tariff sequence. Section 5 offers a 
numerical analysis with log-linear Cobb-Douglas utility function to illustrate the case of 
positive optimal tariffs and increasing consumer’s welfare. Section 6 provides concluding 
remarks. 
4.3. Basic Economic Model   
 We assume discrete time, infinite time-horizons and perfect foresight.  The 
government chooses the path of the tax rate once and for all on date 0 by taking into account 
the competitive equilibrium. First, we present the competitive equilibrium and then solve the 
primal problem. Our framework builds on the approach to optimal taxation. This approach 
characterizes the set of allocations that can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with 
distorting taxes by two simple conditions: a resource constraint and an implementability 
constraint. The implementability constraint is the household budget constraint in which the 
first-order conditions are used to substitute out for tariff policies.  
 We now consider a two-sector small open economic model producing the non-
tradable good and the tradable good, h  and x . The domestic consumers import foreign 
goods, m.  
The Household  
 The representative household's preferences are given by 
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where ( , )ht mtu c c  is the one-period utility function and 0 < 1β <  is the discount rate. htc  and 
mtc  are consumptions in home goods and imported goods (h and m) at date t. The 
representative household has a unit of time endowment. In period t, a fraction tl  of the time 
endowment is allocated to work in the exportable sector and the remaining fraction 1 tl−  is 
allocated to the domestic sector. The utility (.)u  is strictly increasing in consumptions, hc  
and mc , and strictly concave.  
 The household owns technology for producing the home good hc  on date t described 
as 
 ( ) (1 ) ,h t tc l B l
γ= −   (66) 
where the fraction 1 tl−  is allocated to the home good sector and γ is a productivity parameter. 
The home good hc  is non-tradable and the consumption of the nontraded home good is the 
same as the production of the home good. 
 The household earn incomes from the labor ( tl ) of the export sector and capital ( tk ) 
at time t. Households own capital ( tk ) and rent it to firms. The capital depreciates at a rate of 
.kδ  Denote that w and r are the market-determined the wage rate for labor and the rental rate 
of capital from producers. The representative household budget constraint is  
 1(1 ) ( 1 ) ,t mt t t t t k tc k w l r kτ δ++ + = + + −   (67) 
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where tτ  is the rate of tariff levied by the government, 1t tq τ≡ +  is the price of the 
importable, and kδ  is a depreciation rate of private capital stock. 
 The household maximizes its utility (65), subject to the technology of home good (66) 
and the budget constraint (67) and the problem is written as: 
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1 0
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max ( , ), su
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t t k t
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  (68) 
China produces two goods, using two factors: capital (K) and labor (L) inputs.  
The first order conditions with respect to ,mtc  tl  and 1tk +  are given by 
 : ( , ) (1 ),mt m ht mt t tc u c c λ τ= +   (69) 
 : ( , ) ,t l ht mt t tl u c c wλ= −   (70) 
 1 1( 1 ) .t t k trλ β δ λ+ += + −   (71) 
where (.) 0,lu <  and (.) 0mu >  are marginal utilities of labor allotted in the home good 
sector and the import good. 
To simplify these conditions, (69) and (70) together yield, the consumption-labor trade off 
condition, the intratemporal condition, 
 ( , ) ( , ).
(1 )
t
l ht mt m ht mt
t
wu c c u c c
τ
− =
+
  (72) 
Next, combining (69) and (71) yield the consumption Euler equation, the intertemporal 
condition as follows: 
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With a No-Ponzi condition 1
0 1
lim 0 ,
( 1 )
T
T
tT t s t k
k
r δ
+
→∞
= =
 
= Π + − 
∑  the budget condition reduces to 
 [ ]1 0 0
0 1
1 (1 ) ( 1 ) .
( 1 ) t mt t t ktt s t k
c w l r k
r
τ δ
δ
∞
+
= =
+ − = + −
Π + −∑   (74)  
The Firm 
 The firm produces an exportable good at the world at price tp  which is normalize, 
i.e., 1tp =  for all t = 0,1,⋅⋅⋅, ∞. The production function of the exportable good on date t is 
 1( , , ) ,t t t t t tx f G k l AG k l
ϕ θ θ−= =   (75) 
where G and k are public and private capital stocks, and ϕ  and θ  are productivity 
parameters of the public and private capital stocks. Firm takes the public capital stock G as 
given. 
The production function is a constant returns to scale with private inputs, capital ( )k  and 
labor ( ).l  Producer hires labor and rents capital from the household and pays the wage and 
the capital rent to household. 
 Firm's profit at time t is 
 , , .( )t t t t t t t tf G k l w l r kπ = − −   (76) 
where tw  and tr  are the market-determined wage rate for labor and the rental rate of capital. 
The firm’s optimal conditions for private capital and labor are as follows: 
 ( ) 1 1, , ,t k t tt t tt Ar f G k l G k lϕ θ θθ − −= =   (77) 
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 ( ) ( ) 11, ., t tt tt l t tw AG kf G k l lϕ θ θθ − −−= =   (78) 
Since the production function is constant returns to scale and competitive pricing ensures that 
these returns are equal their marginal products, the equilibrium profits are zero. 
The Government 
 Denote by tG  the public capital stock with Gδ  its depreciation rate. The government 
finances its stream of purchases public capital 0{ }t tG
∞
=  by levying time varying tariffs on 
import goods at rate tτ . Since the government has a borrowing constraint at each period, the 
government budget constraint in each period is: 
 1 (1 )t G t t mtG G cδ τ+ − − =   (79) 
where Gδ  is the depreciate rate for public capital stock and 0 1,Gδ< <  and mtc  is the 
consumption of the importable good. 
Comparative Equilibrium 
 We assume that all markets are perfectly comparative. The central planer faces an 
aggregate goods market constraint and using (67), (77), (78), and (79), the resource constrain 
is obtained by 
 1 1 ( ) (1 ) (1 ., , )mt t t G t tt t ktf G k lc G k G kδ δ+ ++ + = + − + −   (80) 
 Given the paths of the government policy instruments 0{ }, t tt Gτ
∞
=  and initial 
conditions for G₀ and k₀, a comparative equilibrium is household’s choices 01{ }, ,mt t t tc l k =+
∞ , 
firm’s choices 0{ },t t tl k
∞
= , and prices 0{ },t t tw r
∞
= , such that: (i) the household optimizes, (72) and 
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(73); (ii) the firm optimizes, (77) and (78); (iii) the government budget constraint, (79); (iv) 
the goods market clears, (80). 
 In equilibrium, by using the firm’s optimal condition of capital in (78), the 
intratemporal condition in (72) becomes 
 ( ), ,( , ) ( , ).
(1 )
l t t t
l ht mt m ht mt
t
f G k l
u c c u c c
τ
− =
+
  (81) 
Moreover, by using the firm’s optimal condition of capital in (77), the intertemporal 
condition in (73) becomes  
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Thus, we obtain new equilibrium conditions, (80), (81), and (82) in terms of , , ,tm tt Gc k and tl . 
 
4.4.  Ramsey Optimal Tariff 
 To solve the Ramsey planer’s problem where the government chooses allocations, 
1, , ,m tt tc Gl +  and 1tk + , rather than tariff rates, tτ , first, by the process of recursively using 
successive household budget constraints (67) to eliminate successive 1tk + terms for t=0,⋅⋅⋅,∞, 
we have  
 [ ] ( )( )1 00
01 1
0 0
(1 )
lim 1 .
( 1 ) ( 1 )
, ,t mt t tt kt tT ts t k s t k
k
c w lk k
r
f G l
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By imposing the transversality condition (No-Ponzi Condition) for capital stocks, i.e., 
1
0 1
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( 1 )
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tT t s t k
k
r δ
+
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= =
 
= Π + − 
∑  we obtain the household's present budget constraint as 
follows: 
 [ ] ( )( )0 0 0 0
0 1
(1 )
1 .
(
, ,
1 )
t mt t t
kt
t s t k
kf G k
c w l
r
l k
τ
δ
δ
∞
= =
+ −
= + −
Π + −∑   (83) 
If we use new household’s intratemporal constraint (81) and intertemporal constrain (82), we 
have 
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Substitute these equations into the household's present budget constraint (83), we obtain the 
implement constraint: 
 [ ] ( )( )0 0 0
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 The Ramsey problem is as follows. The central planner chooses 1, , ,m tt tc Gl +  and 1tk + , 
in order to maximize the representative household’s utility in (65) subject to the 
implementability constraint (84) and the resource constraint (80). 
Optimal Tariff 
 In the primal approach, the central planner chooses 1 1 0{ , , , }mt t tt tG klc
∞
+ + =  in order to 
maximize the representative household’s utility in (65) subject to the implementability 
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constraint (84) and the resource constraint (80). Let µ  be the Lagrange multiplier on the 
impelmentability constraint (84) and define new preference function W to include the 
implementability constraint as follow: 
 [ ]( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )ht mt ht mt m ht mt mt l ht mt tW c c u c c u c c c u c c lµ= + −   (85) 
 The Ramsey problem is 
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where tφ  is the Lagrange multiplier on the resource constraint at time t. 
The first order conditions for this problem are for 1,t ≥  
 : ( , ) 0,mt ht mm ttc cW c φ =−   (87) 
 : ( ) 0( ) , ,, ,t l tht mt l t t tc cl f G k lW φ =−   (88) 
 [ ]1 1: ( ), , 1 0,tt t GG tt tf G lG kφ βφ δ+ +− + + − =   (89) 
 [ ]1 1: ( ), , 1 0,tt t kk tt tf G lk kφ βφ δ+ +− + + − =   (90) 
 1 1( ) (1 ) (1 ) 0., , G t t k t t mtt t t Gf G k l G k k cδ δ+ ++ − − + − − − =   (91) 
The Ramsey Allocations  
 Combining the optimal conditions, (87) and (88), we obtain an intratemporal 
condition:  
 ( , ) , ,
( , )
( ).ht mt l t t t
ht mt
l
m
W
W
c c f G k l
c c
− =   (92) 
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Moreover, using (87) and (90), we obtain an intertemporal condition: 
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= + −   (93) 
Equation (92) shows that the government's marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption of import goods and labor in the export sector equals to the marginal product of 
labor in the exportable good at date t. Similarly, equation (93) equates the government's 
marginal rate of substitution between consumption today and consumption tomorrow to the 
gross capital return (net of depreciation). 
 The optimal tariff can be determined by substituting the Ramsey allocation into the 
equilibrium conditions. Combining the household’s intratemporal constraint (72), the firm’s 
first order condition for labor (78) and the planer’s intratemporal constraint (92), we solve 
out for the optimal tariff for 1t ≥  as follows: 
 * ( , ) ( , )
( , )
1.
( , )
ht mt ht mt
ht mt ht mt
m l
t
m l
u W
W u
c c c c
c c c c
τ = −   (94) 
Now we consider a separable utility function: 
 1( , ) ln( ) ln ln(1 ) (1 ) ln ,ht mt ht mt t mtu c c c c B l c
α α α γαγ α−= = + − + −   (95) 
where α  and (1 )α− are the shares of expenditure on the home good and the importable good. 
Then ( , )ht mtW c c  can be written as 
 ln ln(1 ) (1 ) ln (1 )( , ) .
1
t
t mt
t
ht mt
lB l cW c c
l
α γαγ α µ α αγ αγ
  
+ − + − + − + −  −  
=   (96) 
Differentiating (96) with respect to mtc  and tl , we obtain 
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Substituting (97) and (98) into the optimal tariff, (94), for 1,t ≥  then the optimal import tariff 
is 
 * * .1t tl
µτ =
−
  (99) 
This implies that under the linear log utility function given by (95), we find that the optimal 
tariffs are positive.  
4.5.  An Algorithm for Computing Optimal Import Tariff Sequence 
 
 We compute the sequence of optimal tariffs and evaluate welfare gains through the 
following five steps: 
 First, from the Ramsey problem, we find the system of equations at the steady state 
given by four first order conditions and the planner's resource constraint as follows: 
 (1 ) 0,
mss
ssc
α φ−− =   (100) 
 ( ) 12
(1 ) 1 0,
(1 )
ss
ss ss ss ss
ss
l AG k l
l
ϕ θ θαγ µ αγ φ θ − −
+ −
− − =
−
  (101) 
 1 11 1 0,ss ss ss GAG k l
ϕ θ θβ ϕ δ− −− + +   = −   (102) 
 1 11 1 0,ss ss ss kAG k l
ϕ θ θβ θ δ− −− + +   = −   (103) 
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 1 0.ss ss ss G ss k ss mssAG k l G k c
ϕ θ θ δ δ− − − − =   (104) 
In this system, there are six variables, , , , , ,ss ss ss ss mssG k l cφ  and µ . However we have only 
five equations. We assume that in the steady state, 1/ 3ssl =  and we solve the systems for the 
five unknown variables. The optimal values at the steady state as follows: 
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From the steady state, we obtain the value of the Lagrange multiplier µ  which depends on 
.ssl   
Second, having computed the steady –state allocations, the Lagrange multiplier µ , we look 
at the first order conditions and the resource constraint for 1,t ≥  which are given by  
 (1 ) 0,
mt
tc
α φ−− =   (110) 
 ( ) 12
(1 ) 1 0,
(1 )
t
t t t t
t
l AG k l
l
ϕ θ θαγ µ αγ φ θ − −
+ −
− − =
−
  (111) 
 1 1 11 1 0,t t t t t GAG k l
ϕ θ θφ βφ ϕ δ− − −+  − + + − =   (112) 
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 1 11 1 1 1 1 0,t t t t t kAG k l
ϕ θ θφ φ β θ δ− −+ + + +− −  + + =   (113) 
 1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) 0.t t t t G t t k ss mtAG k l G G k k c
ϕ θ θ δ δ− + +− + − − + − − =   (114) 
Since Lagrange multiplier μ is obtain from the steady state, we have seven unknown 
variables, 1 1 1, , , , , ,t t t t mt tG k l l c φ+ + + and 1tφ + , and five optimal equations. 
Using the optimal equations (110)-(114), we obtain two dynamic equations 1tk +  and 1tG +  as 
follows: 
 1 1
( ) (1 ) (1 ) ,k G t tt t G t k ss mt
t t
G kG k G k c
G k
δ δ
δ δ
θ ϕ+ +
−
+ = + − + − −
−
  (115) 
 
[ ]
1
1 1
1
1
1
1
1 1 1
1 1 1
21 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )( )
(1 ) ( ) ( )
t t k G t t t t t
t t k G t t k G t G t t
t t k G t t
A G k G k G G k
A G k G k k G k
A G k G k
ϕ θ ϕ
θ θ
ϕ
θ
ϕ
θ
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
θ θ θ
µ θ ϕ δ δ θ ϕ
θ ϕ δ δ β ϕ δ δ δ θ ϕ
µ θ ϕ δ δ
− −
− −
−
−
−
−
− − −
− − −
+ + +
− − −
+ + +
 
+ − − − − 
 
 
− − − − + − − 
 
+ − − −
=
1
1
1
1 1
21 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
.
( ) ( )
t
t t k G t t
G
A G k G k
θ ϕ
θ
ϕ
θθ θ θθ ϕ δ δ
−
−
−
−
+ +
− − −
+ + + +
 
 
 
 
− − − 
 
 (116) 
 Third, since the steady-state levels of public and private capitals, ssG  and ssk , and 
labor in the exportable sector, ssl  depends on the initial values of public and private capital 
stocks 0G  and 0k , we guess the initial values of public and private capital stocks 0G  and 0k . 
After the iterations converge, the public and private capital stocks are matched with the 
steady-state values obtained in the first step. If they don't, the initial guess for 0G  and 0k  is 
corrected. This is repeated, until the iterations converge to the steady-state allocations. 
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 Fourth, we use the sequence of allocations 1{ , }
T
t t tG k = , to compute the entire sequence 
1{ }
T
t tl =  by using the optimal condition 
 
1
1
1 1
1 1
( ) .
( )
k G t t
t
t t
G kl
A G k
ϕ
θ
θ θ
δ δ
θ ϕ
−
−
− −
−
=
−
  (117) 
Given initial public and private capital stocks 0G  and 0k , if the value for ssl  obtained in step 
4 matches with the one given, we stop. Otherwise, the guess for ssl  is updated, and steps 1-4 
is repeated, until convergence is achieved. 
 Finally, after steps 1-4 converge, the optimal sequence of import tariffs 1{ }
T
t tτ =  is 
obtained from  
 .
1t tl
µτ =
−
  (118) 
4.6.  Numerical Analysis 
 
 We use a separable utility function ( , ) ln ln(1 ) (1 ) ln .ht mt t mtc c B lu c
α γαγ α= + − + −  
We choose parameters α = 0.4 and 3,γ =  and nomalize B=1. We use the Cobb-Douglas 
production function 1 1 .t t t tx AG k l
ϕ θ θ− −=  We choose the shares of public and private capitals at 
0.5ϕ =  and 0.3θ = , and A=2. The annual time preference rate is 0.9,β =  and the 
depreciation rates of public and private capital stocks are 0.1Gδ =  and 0.3kδ = . The 
parameters are summarized in Table 4.1.  
 To solve the levels of the steady state, we assume that the level of labor in the 
exportable sector is 1/ 3.ssl =  Using the solutions for the steady-state, (105) - (109), we 
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obtain the steady state levels of the variables, , , , ,ss ss ss mssG k cφ  and µ , where µ  is the 
Lagrange multiplier on the implement constraint as following Table 4.2.  
 From the steady state solutions, we find that the optimal tariff is 0.7041ssτ =  which is 
positive. We assume that the initial values of public and private capital stocks are lower than 
the levels of the steady states and set and the initial values of public and private capital stock 
as G₀=0.95885* ssG =1.1583 and k₀=0.97* ssk =0,6017. Using the value of the Lagrange 
multiplier on the implement constraint 0.4694,µ =  and the initial values, we find the 
sequence of allocations of public and private capital stocks and a share of labor in the export 
sector 1{ , , }
T
t t t tG k l = , converge to the steady state levels and obtain the optimal sequence of 
import tariffs 1{ }
T
t tτ = .  
Trends in the Public and Private Capital Stock 
 In assessing the public and private capital stocks and its relationship to output, it is 
important to take into account both the volume of capital stocks (the physical amount of 
capital goods) and the ratios of capital stocks to gross domestic product (GDP) each period.  
Figure 4.1.  and Figure 4.2.  below describe that the ratios of public and private capital stocks 
to GDP. 
The initial ratios of public and private capital to GDP are 1.408 and 0.731 and reach to the 
highest levels 1.457 and 0.73818. However, after reaches to the highest level, the ratios 
slightly drop and move to the steady state levels. 
The Figure 4.3. illustrates the pattern of the share of labor in the export sector. Labor income 
from the export sector is the main source for household’s income. Using the income, the 
household consumes import goods and increases his/her utility. In this model, we assume that 
the initial levels of public and private capital stock are lower than those of the levels of 
84 
 
 
steady state. The lower levels of capital stocks cause lower wage and capital rent from the 
private capital stock.  
 In order to increase household income, the consumer initially works more than the 
level of the steady state. From the government investments in the public capital financed 
through the import tariffs, the household increases private capital stock and reduces the share 
of labor in the export sector shown in Figure 4.3. This implies that the consumers enjoy more 
home goods (non-traded goods) such as gardening, home cooked meal or leisure. As the 
public and private capital stock reach to the levels of the steady state, the share of labor in the 
export sector also arrives the level of the steady state. 
 The countries endowed lower levels of public and private capital stocks initially 
levies higher tariff rates for import goods. As the both capital stocks have accumulated, the 
government reduces the import tariffs. Figure 4.4. provides the optimal tariff rates which are 
positive even in the level of steady state. The public capital is an important input to produce 
exportable goods and the higher level of a public capital stock increases the marginal product 
of labor and capital that are the same as the wage and capital rent. In other words, the 
increase in a public capital stock increases household’s income. Thus, the income effect of 
the public capital stock is larger than the substitute effect of between shares of labor in the 
exportable sector and home good sector. The consumer reduces the share in the export sector. 
 Finally, Figure 4.5. depicts the trends of consumer’s welfare. Increases both home 
goods and import goods consumptions improve the consumers’ welfare. The level of the 
welfare gradually increases and reached the level of the steady state when the allocations of 
the public and private capital stocks and the share of labor in export sector stay in the levels 
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of the steady state. This result shows that the use of import tariffs is the optimal trade policy 
under this special economy.  
4.7.  Concluding Remarks 
 
 Many developing countries face tighter budget. Although they have vast poor 
population, it is hard to increase public investments because of budget constraints. Public 
capital is the main component of private productions, for instance, primarily transportation 
systems, such as highways, mass transit, water supply, and power facilities. Public capital 
stocks plays a very import role for the firms’ productivities. Therefore, allocating public 
investment becomes critically important for the public policy. This paper examines the 
contributions of public capital to economic growth and productivity growth of the economy 
as well as consumer’s welfare. The study provides positive impacts of public capital on 
production sector. Government intervention in the international market through import tariffs 
improves domestic production and social welfare. We show that the optimal tariffs are 
positive but decreases to the steady state level. Since the initial public and private capital 
stocks are lower than the levels of the steady state, the representative household spend more 
time to produce the exportable goods to obtain higher income compare to the level of the 
steady state. Increases in the public and private capital stock drops the share of labor home in 
the export sector and the consumer spend his/her time on the home goods, for instance, 
leisure or gardening. When the capital stocks reach to the levels of steady state, the share of 
labor in the export sector also arrive the level of the steady state. Thus, in the special 
economy, the optimal trade policy is the imposition of tariffs. 
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Figure 4.1. Ratio of Public Capital Stock to GDP 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Ratio of Private Capital Stock to GDP 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Share of Labor in Export Sector 
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Figure 4.4. Optimal Import Tariff 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Consumer’s Welfare 
 
Table 4.1. The values of parameters 
L A B θ   ϕ  β  γ  α  kδ  Gδ  
1 2 1 0.3 0.3 0.9 3 0.3 0.3 0.1 
 
Table 4.2. The values of the steady state 
ssG   ssk  ssl  mssc  hssc  ssφ  ssτ  µ  
1.208 0.6203 0.333 0.5431 0.2963 1.288 0.7041 0.4694 
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CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
China has been accused of intentionally depressing the value of its currency, the 
renminbi, to gain unfair advantages in the global market. If producers and consumers in both 
countries act as price takers, the equilibrium prices of the traded goods are determined by the 
supplies and demands in the world market, and the benchmark yuan value of the dollar is 
determined in a competitive market. An important policy question is whether China will 
benefit from devaluing the yuan from the benchmark equilibrium rate. An optimal exchange 
rate may depend on the exchange rate pass-through to the yuan price of China’s exports or 
the dollar price of U.S. imports. As the yuan peg is raised, the exchange rate pass-through 
may not be perfect. If the yuan price of China’s export rises more than proportionately, then 
China’s optimal policy is a yuan devaluation. China’s elasticity of the export price index with 
respect to exchange rate has been less than unity since 2003. This implies that China’s yuan 
devaluation policy has been consistent with the prediction of the main proposition. 
While tariffs and non-tariff barriers are bound by various agreements in the WTO, 
there are no such agreements among countries on the bilateral exchange rates. The IMF 
monitors only the exchange rates of developing countries that are beset by large balance of 
payments deficits. The WTO regulates only tariff and various non-tariff barriers, but has 
made little effort to regulate the bilateral exchange rates because exchange rate practices are 
within the purview of the IMF. The finding that tariffs and the undervalued yuan have the 
same effects on domestic prices and import volumes suggests that currency pegging can be 
viewed as a trade policy. Either the WTO or IMF could begin to consider regulation of 
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currency practices of developing countries in the face of large trade imbalances between 
major trading countries. 
                                                 
i Jin and Choi (2013) noted that while in the short run some profits might be generated by 
slightly deviating from the equilibrium exchange rates, in the long run excessive hoarding of 
reserve assets can only result in huge losses to PBC’s balance of payment account.  
 
ii If the equilibrium exchange rate is 6 (6 yuan = $1), then new renminbi can be issued so that 
6 old yuan = 1 new yuan. With this currency conversion, the equilibrium dollar price of the 
new renminbi is 1. In the empirical work, we relax this assumption to derive the equilibrium 
exchange rates in each period. 
iii In empirical analyses the value of oε  cannot be fixed arbitrarily, but must be derived from 
the balanced trade condition. 
iv The Chinese currency devaluation may not be the only source of U.S. trade deficits. For 
instance, Beladi and Oladi (2014) suggest that outsourcing may widen U.S. trade deficits. 
Also, Yue and Zhang (2013) emphasize that the U.S. trade deficit would not be reduced very 
much by a change in the Chinese exchange rate. 
v Of course, the first-best policy is to remove wage and rent rigidity in the factor markets. 
Given this rigidity, Chinese government may be using yuan devaluation as a second-best 
policy. 
vi In the same vein, Bruno (1976) considered a two-sector model, but defined the exchange 
rate as the ratio of the price of the tradable good to that of the nontradable good. 
vii See Holtemöller and Mallick (2013) for a model of currency misalignment. They show that 
the higher the flexibility of the currency regime, the lower is the misalignment. 
viii Devereux (2000) analyzed the impact of devaluation on the trade balance when exchange 
rate pass-through is imperfect. 
ix For instance, if China is abundant in labor and production of C is labor-intensive, China is 
expected to export good C and import good Z. 
x For instance, 1 121 1( 1) 0,LL C C CF A L K
α βα α −= − <  1 1 21 1( 1) 0,KK C C CF A L K
α ββ β −= − <  
1 11 1
1 1 0,LK C C CF A L K
α βα β − −= > and ( ) ( )1 1 22 1 11 1 1 1(1 ) 0.LL KK LK C C CF F F A L Kα βα β α β − −− = − − >   
xi Money as a financial instrument does not enter the utility function directly, but indirectly 
through a change in income, which ultimately affects consumption. See Al-Abri (2014) for a 
model in which utility depends on money balances. 
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xii If the benchmark equilibrium value of $1 is 6 RMB, new RMB notes can be issued at the 
rate of 6 RMB for 1 new RMB. 
xiii
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xv It can be shown that 
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xvi Jiang and Kim (2013) show that exchange rate pass-through to the producer price index 
and the retail price index are both incomplete. Without concavity of ( ),b δ  multiple optimal 
exchange rates may exist, including the exchange rate that yields some unemployment. 
xvii Under assumption / 0,r δ∂ ∂ >  the effects of the exchange rate on output C and Z are 
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